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Abstract 
The advent of the European Union has necessitated an adaptation on the part of 
governments, especially in those areas where the Community's laws supersede the national 
laws. The process whereby the Union affects the state has been characterised as 
'Europeanisation.' This paper examines the adaptation in certain policy areas, not of policy 
itself, but at changes in the decision-making mechanisms that accompany membership in 
Union. It focuses on change in foreign policy mechanisms in Britain and Sweden, both 
unique case studies because of their histories. 
I argue that changes in foreign policy mechanisms reflect a change in the construct of the 
state itself given the delicacy of this particular policy area. Because foreign policy making 
remains within the ambit of respective member states, with the CFSP, the second pillar of 
the Maastricht treaty, encouraging, at best coordination by states, without imposing 
supranationality, foreign policy coordination in the European Union is mostly an 
intergovernmental affai r . 
The changes in decision-making mechanisms however, has jeopardised the accepted notion 
of sovereignty in EU states as Sweden battles to retain her neutrality identity and Britain 
struggles to keep its Atlantic alliance intact while being part of Europe. Moreover, although 
the present changes have not removed foreign policy within the Union from 
intergovernmental level, that position too is fast changing. It is too early to say that the 
CFSP or the CESDP wil l supersede national foreign policy, and possibly, for a long time it 
would not; however, the new mechanisms in place allow for change in this aspect of the 
Union. In essence, as national foreign policy mechanisms evolve to accommodate 
membership, the CFSP too is adapting to the influence of the states and in the final analysis 
has the most potential to shape the future of the Union. 
INTRODUCTION 
International Relations has predominantly studied the relations between nation states. Hans 
Morgenthau's seminal book, Politics among Nations (1973), effectively outlines this leading 
view of international politics. 1 Indeed, Morgenthau is famous for the modern Realist theory 
of international relations; however, while many dispute his characterisation of motives for 
international politics, there has been a general acceptance of who the most relevant actor 
is: the state. 
The state, according to Morgenthau, is " ... the ultimate reference point of contemporary 
foreign policy. "2 There is a measure of truth to this statement; therefore, any respectable 
study on foreign policy must examine the state. On a superficial level, the state is a fixed 
territory, which is legally and politically independent and has control over the citizenry in its 
territory. Daniel Papp specifically defines the state as "a geographically bounded entity, 
governed by a central authority that has the ability to make laws, rules and decisions and to 
enforce those laws and decisions within its boundaries. "3 Of those laws and decisions, we 
may include external policies which include diplomatic, trade and security policies of one 
state vis-a-vis another. 
Although the state retai ns critical relevance, emphasis must be placed on the fact that many 
theorists question the notion of the state as sole actor in the international system and are 
continually challenging its role as a predominant actor. Actors often regarded as effe·ctual in 
the international system, include non-governmental, intergovernmental and transnational 
organisations. This study acknowledges the increased role of these entities in international 
relations. However, it seeks to examine another entity that may pose a challenge to the 
nation state in Europe: the European Union. The institutions of the European Union (EU) 
have been assigned some authority by member states to carry out their functions. This in 
effect, may change the traditional functions and role of the modern nation state to its 
citizens as well as to the international community. Specifically, the study seeks to examine 
institutional change within the state's foreign policy structures, given the dynamics of the 
European Union, in the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
1 Other works in this trad ition include Kenneth Waltz's two books Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis 
(1959) and Theories of International Politics (1979) 
2 Morgenthau, Hans J. (1973). Politics among Nations. 5th ed. New York: Alfred Knopf, pp9-10 
3 Papp, DanielS. (1984). Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding. London and New 
York: Macmillan, p14 
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EU policy powers have already sparked debate as to how member states coordinate their 
policies to meet EU regulations. Here, the focus is not to test actual policy change, as many 
scholars have broached that subject in the past. 4 Instead, the concern of this thesis will 
centre on how trade and defence and foreign policy bureaus in specific member states 
(Britain and Sweden) relate to European Union structures in implementing external policy 
for themselves as members of the Union. In essence, the state seems to be changing, given 
the new institutional mechanisms employed, to make external policies since joining the 
European Union. 
Sweden is pertinent to this study as it provides another perspective of the possibility of 
change in a smaller state. Traditionally, foreign policy theory posits that smaller states tend 
to align their choices based on the system's structure. By all accounts then, it is conceivable 
that after much resistance, Sweden agreed to join the Community as its expansion and 
function was shaping the international system too. 5 Although Sweden joined the EU, she still 
maintains her national currency and non-alignment stance. Unlike the other larger drivers of 
the EU, such as France and Germany, Britain is often called the 'awkward' partner. Thus, I 
have considered Britain in this study because, unlike France or Germany, Britain's alliance 
to the United States for instance, has precluded her from integration to the extent of other 
member states. It is much more interesting therefore, to test institutional change in Britain 
due to this seeming reluctance. 
In choosing Britain and Sweden as primary case studies, the intent is not to predict the 
future of the EU as a whole or make conclusions that bind all member states. Instead, this 
study could shed new light on how change in state institutions can have different or similar 
consequences for some of IR's theoretical tenets, like sovereignty. 
Within the Europeanisation literature6 , many authors have attempted to explain how states 
adapt policies that conform to European Union laws. While this may be true, national 
4 Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies. (1996), eds. Yves 
Meny, Pierre Muller and Jean-l ouis Quermonne. london and New York: Routledge 
5 Bengt Sundelius . "Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community" in European 
Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe. (1994). eds. Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith. 
london: Sage Publications, p182 
6 Borneman, John and Fowler, Nick. (1997) "Europeanization" Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26 pp487-514; 
Annesley, Claire. (2003). "Americanised ad Euroepanised: UK Social Policy since 1997" The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, Vol. 5 No. 2 pp143-165; Moreno, luis. (2003). Europeanisation, 
Mesogovernments and Safety Nets" European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42 No. 2 pp271-85; Armstrong, 
Kenneth A. (2006). "The 'Europeanisation' of Social Exclusion: British Adaptation to EU Coordination" The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 8 No. 1 pp79-100; Buller, Jim. (2003). "The Europeanization of 
National Politics?" Government and Opposition Vol. 38 No. 4 pp528-535 
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identity is not of interest here even if it was synonymous with policy objectives. Moreover, 
as European states themselves continue to shape European foreign policy, this study cannot 
be characterised in terms of Europeanisation. 
The goals of this thesis are relatively narrow. It will evaluate whether membership in the EU 
has affected the organisation of security objectives (external policies) in two very different 
member states. I argue that the EU case is something of a hybrid and an unfinished one at 
that. While other possible sources have been acknowledged for their contribution to the 
'decline of the state', the main concern of this paper will be to highlight the new institutional 
mechanisms and bureaucratic arrangements being employed to make external policies. The 
paper examines the changing nature of the European state. The emphasis of this study is on 
institutional change not policy adaptation. 
The study will mainly make use of qualitative research methods, with the inclusion of 
personal correspondence used in lieu of actual interviews, where applicable. 
This thesis does not argue that the nation state is irrelevant. Instead, the study concludes 
that the institution of the European Union and its added powers in proportion to the possible 
decrease in state powers are not necessarily detrimental to the state itself. These states 
have employed new mechanisms or modify the existing ones to maintain their 
preponderance in this policy area . 
Change and the nation state in the European Union is concerned primarily with high politics, 
i.e. external policy in terms of trade, defence and security and therefore excludes foreign 
development policy. 
I hope that this dissertation will add to the body of work already bridging the extremes. On 
t he one hand is one school of thought that argues that the state remains the most relevant 
participant in determin ing world politics through its foreign policies; and on the other is 
another school that views the state as weak in its ability to continue in that role of architect 
of the international syst em. Instead, this study will be looking at institutional change and 
what implications it may have for shaping the EU or the international system . 
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The first chapter will br iefly examine the state itself, some of its traditional authority and 
expected responsibilities in general and especially in the study of international politics. In 
addition, this section will look at what makes the European Union a hybrid institution, 
neither a nation state, nor a complete intergovernmental organisation; neither a federal nor 
a complete confederal arrangement. Hence, for the purposes of this paper, the EU is a 
unique, unfinished instit ution of the international system. 
The second and third chapters commence with a look at the European Union's formation, to 
give a background on European integration and its evolution. Given the aims and the 
functions of the Union, the study attempts to explain how member state bureaucracies 
function in relation to the European Union on matters of foreign policy objectives and 
implementation. In essence, this section will look at what duties they still have and which 
ones, if any, they have ceded to the Union. Particularly, it will examine how national 
interests are coordinated in Brussels, while accounting for membership in the Union. A 
general discussion of the EU's structures is necessary to justify why states are changing in 
general. The paper will not be looking at the EU/domestic policy functions of those 
bureaucracies, e.g. socia l welfare policies. The end of this section will reflect further on the 
state of the State in Western Europe. Through bureaucratic relations between the two states 
and their European Un ion counterparts in forming EU-wide and individual national foreign 
policies, one may draw conclusions about the EU as an institution . 
The fourth chapter attempts to explain the implications of these changes. Particularly, these 
implications will reflect t he irregularities of the system, due to membership in the EU. It will 
also argue that these implications must be viewed in the context of change in studying 
international politics. The paper will examine some aspects of sovereignty. The study of 
states in international relations often rests in the understanding of where sovereignty lies. 
This concept is too broad for the scope of a mini-dissertation; however, an analysis of the 
state's institutional change in foreign policy making since joining the EU, is useful for 
understanding some of t he larger theoretical challenges of the concept . Sovereignty here is 
not a legal concept, but as package of attributes expected of a modern state, such as the 
ability to be in sole control of its external policy and the decision-making processes. In 
addition, this section will attempt a more in-depth assessment of the bid to produce a 
common foreign EU security and defence policy, as foreign policy decision-making changes 
within a state have an impact on this process. There are obvious advantages and 
disadvantages to a com mon EU policy and those will be covered here. 
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The conclusion will survey the issues that have been raised by the study and their 




International System and the State 
What is the State? 
The concept of states arose following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. After the Thirty Years 
War that ended the supreme political authority of the Roman Catholic Church and its Pope, 
1648 thus began the process of establishing sovereign entities of states, as we know them 
today. 7 As introduced earlier, the state consists of three main characteristics: territory, 
legitimacy, and sovereignty. 
A fixed territory is a characteristic of the state established by international treaties during 
the course of the last 300 years. This means that a government is established over a group 
of people who live in a particular geographical area. This government has the right to tax 
and regulate entry and exit from the area it has authority of. 8 This then leads to the other 
characteristic of legitimacy. While a government may lay claim to an area, it needs 
legitimacy; that is, it must be recognised by both the residents of that given area and other 
states that constitute the international system. Within this established, legitimate territory, 
the main function of the government is to provide public goods such as welfare and general 
infrastructure to the citizen. Above all, the onus is on the state to provide security for its 
citizenry from foreign invasion as well as internal disintegration. It must be pointed out that 
because a state claims a particular territory, it does not mean that it has legitimacy. This is 
particularly true when t he people in that area do not recognise the governorship of the state 
or the international system does not recognise the state. For instance, while the Turkish 
Cypriots believe in the legitimacy of their territory, it is not a territory recognised as a state 
by the United Nations. 
Gradually, the state is experiencing transformation. In "The State of the State: The Model of 
the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation", Roland Axtmann draws attention 
to this. 9 Although we also acknowledge that the process by which states are established 
have been gradual, it st ill does not completely fulfill all the purported characteristics of the 
ideal state. The characteristic of sovereignty is one of such. Sovereignty as intended should 
mean that no geographical entity, the state, be subservient or directly accountable to 
another. Specifically, it should mean that no authority higher than the state exists. This, as 
7 Papp, op. cit. p13 
8 McCormick, John. (2002). Understanding the European Union . 2"d ed. New York: Palgrave, p2 
9 Axtmann, Roland (2004) "The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary 
. Transformation" Vol. 25 No. 3, pp259-279 
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we will learn, has never truly been the case. As I mentioned earlier, sovereignty for the 
purposes of this paper will deviate from this standard understanding. The reason for this is 
t hat never has there been a time when the state has been completely free to do as it 
wished. In the first instance, the existence of alliances, treaties and the authority of 
international law limit this characteristic because states have the duty to fulfil these 
obligations to uphold peace . In the second instance, the Cold War era polarised the world to 
t he extent that the United States and USSR had immense influence over many of their 
respective allies; in sum, no state is ever truly sovereign . Axtmann notes that the 
t ransformation of the nation state in regards to the 'loss' of sovereignty is affected by the 
internationalization of t he state and democratic governance. By this, he implies that the 
nature of democratising a state is often subject to international scrutiny. It has now become 
difficult for governments to act simply for their interests as their interest may be tied to the 
perspective of the international community. 10 
In addition to the decrease of the so-called sovereign powers and the state's ability to 
provide the most important public good, security, is decreasing in many regions of the 
world . As one observer notes, the state's ability to absolutely secure its citizenry has long 
been eradicated by the existence of nuclear weapons. 11 One could say that in this age, the 
constancy of the international threat of terrorism further proves this point. Therefore, the 
citizenry will find new ways to organise and protect themselves, usually through trans-
national organisations, thereby shrinking the sphere of authority of the nation state even 
more. 12 
Understanding International Politics and the State 
As I indicated earlier, the study of international politics is often conceptualised in terms of 
states13 as the main actor. It is on this basis that Hans Morgenthau, deservedly the father of 
modern international politics, wrote Politics among Nations. Morgenthau asserts that 
international relations are the relation between states as each search to maximise their 
power. 14 The reason for the search for power is quite plausible: interests. This is what 
10 Axtmann, op. cit. pp268-272 
11 Rosenau, James N. 1997. Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Explaining Governance is a Turbulent World, 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, p351 
12 Ibid. 
13 The term state and nation-state in this context will be used interchangeable unless otherwise specified and they 
are used to mean government of a country. 
14 Morgenthau, op. cit. pS. Th is is not the only claim Morgenthau makes to outline his modern Realist theory of 
international relations; however, this is the most pertinent for this paper. 
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defines the ideologies of foreign policy. 15 As Papp explains however, 'national interest' is an 
"ambiguous" term that is never clearly defined. 16 With each successive government within a 
particular country, interests are likely to change. If this is true, is this a viable concept to 
base the nature of international politics? National interest may be defined in the economic 
sense with the view that policy that enhances a country's economy is of national interest. 
For example, while the Chinese government might not want to be involved with the Western 
democracies, they offer large markets and that seems to supersede other ideological 
disagreements. This way we can see that the claim that power is sought to attain or protect 
interests, is not sufficient and in fact can be confusing. 
The point here is not to challenge the motives of state action per se; instead, the above 
explanation is necessary to understand how the state has attained and retained 
preponderance as the main actor in the field of international relations . In addition, it will 
help to demonstrate the flaws of this assumption, given the complexity of the international 
system and the rise of other institutions alongside national governments. 
A classic Realist assumption of the state is that it acts as a unitary actor. Although various 
schools of thought dispute this argument, this assumption is still often implied when we 
speak of 'the state' in reference to the national government of a state. Indeed, this paper 
will refer to the state as the government of one country, acting in concert for the sake of 
simplicity . But when a member of a particular state acts, are they acting for self or for 
national interests? This is especially crucial when studying foreign policy, as it creates a 
problem with the level of analysis. In light of the European Union, where, as will be shown, 
some foreign policy aspects have been left to the discretion of the Union as a whole, the 
assumption of national interest could be redundant and the unitary actor thesis completely 
undermined. 
I n spite of some of these flaws, we find that most policies that affect the international order 
are still made inside states and between states, and this is why Morgenthau is not entirely 
wrong in some of his assertions. But again, given the existence of the EU, perhaps Realism 
needs to be revisited in its entirety, not simply modified. 
15 Morgenthau, op. cit. chpt. 7 
16 Papp, op. cit. p23 
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Theoretical Perspectives on the Changing International System of States 
It stems from the theoretical . perspective of IR that states are the central sphere of 
authority (SOA)17 in determining foreign policy and consequently political world affairs. In 
the years before the Second World War and during the Cold War, there seemed to be ease 
and accuracy in evaluating IR theory with states playing the feature role. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the new system of functionality however, created 
anomalies in the general understanding of international system. These changes in the 
international system create a problem of theoretically analysing governance since, as we 
will see later, they challenge the notions of sovereignty for instance which is key to the 
primacy of the state as the central SOA in the evaluation of world politics. It must be 
reiterated however, that " .. .[there are] subtle ways in which states continue to be the 
primary actors on the world stage even as their control erodes with the widening of the 
Frontier. "18 
Rosenau explains the Frontier as the linking of those spheres of analysis that formerly 
delineated between foreign and domestic affairs, to theorise about world politics. This 
Frontier is critical to the understanding of shifts in the SOA from the state to other avenues. 
Those avenues are discussed in the next section as to how the practical functions of entities 
in the international system "shrink" the SOA of the state. 19 Given this, Rosenau writes 
" .. . few, if any states remain static and most have adapted a capacity to adapt to a 
transforming world. "20 This is true of this study, as we consider the mechanisms used to 
determine foreign policy; they reflect change. Having acknowledged that the world is 
transforming, we must ask what is it transforming from and to what is it transforming? The 
theoretical aspects of IR often assessed in terms of a state-centric world system where 
states have the powers they should have and are the primary decision makers . Rosenau 
argues that currently there is not one centric model for the world as it transforms. Because 
fragmentation is taking place, several systems exist next to each other particularly the 
state-centric and the multi-centric that have a variety of actors (refugee groups, weak 
states etc) with no central locus, existing together with a role to play in shaping the 
structure of the system. 21 
17 This term is derived from its use by James N. Rosenau; SOA is the avenue where authority is constituted. 
18 Rosenau, 1997, op. cit. p342 
19 Ibid., p343 
20 Ibid. I p346 
21 Rosenau, James N. (1990) . Turbulence in World Politics : A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 
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The Problematic of States: Practical Challenges to the State Centric Model 
In recent years, various pundits have claimed that the state is declining and this has 
implications for theorising in the field and in the area of foreign policy. By this decline, they 
generally indicate that the power of states (in the context of International Relations) to 
determine the fate of t he international system, is eroding for several reasons as already 
alluded to by James Rosenau. More specific reasons attributing to this decline are: economic 
interdependence, trans-national movements, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations, growing power of multinational corporations and technology_22 
By economic interdependence, we mean that states, for the most part, have moved 
away from earlier mercantilist tendencies for political reasons, to more economic integration 
with the global system with the hopes of further economic growth. This, in essence, limits 
the capacities of states, as it becomes necessary to take decisions in concert with other 
parties, or at least with consideration for other parties as opposed to a strictly self-
interested decision-making approach. In this era of globalisation, this logic is especially true. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) probably have the most negative reputation for their 
contribution to the decline of the state. MNCs are important because of how much they 
contribute to the international political economy. Inadvertently, they have become a deeply 
political tool of foreign policy. Particularly, it has been argued that the existence of MNCs 
have resulted in a loss of sovereignty for the host states. 23 Daniel Papp notes, for example 
those decisions taken in the corporate headquarters of a particular MNC can determine the 
employment rates of a host country. 24 Although this is true, states also try to reassert 
control over their domains with some measure of success. One way in which this has been 
done, is by preventing repatriation of profits as a condition for operation within a state, as 
some Latin American countries have done. In these countries, the state stipulates that all 
profits must remain in t he country for a specific period and after that time expires, a certain 
percentage may leave. 25 
In terms of transnational movements, people have become mobile, ignoring the limits of 
physical boundaries. Today, approximately 1.4 billion email messages cross national borders 
22 Papp, op. cit. p32; McCormick, op. cit. p3; James N. Rosenau (2002). "Ageing Agendas and Ambiguous 
Anomalies; Tensions and Cont radictions of an Emergent Epoch." in The New Agendas for International Relations: 
From Polarization to Globalization in World Politics? ed. Stephanie Lawson. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
23 This was proposed in Raymond Vernon 's 1971 book, Sovereignty at Bay: the Multinational Spread of US 
Enterprises London: Longman 
24 Papp, op. cit. pp68-69 
25 Ibid., p69 
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daily and a large number of people travel for tourist as well permanent immigration 
purposes. 26 In some cases it is not voluntary, as many people leave their lives of poverty 
and war torn societies behind, especially in terms of permanent immigration. This too 
speaks to the inability of states to deliver primary political goods, and therefore its 
perceived decline. 
Another way in which st ates have been deemed to lose a measure of their power is through 
international intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. International 
non-governmental organisations or NGOs are those organisations that work outside the 
influence of national governments, whose aims are usually to influence policy change or 
protect and promote the interests of its members. 27 It should be noted that multinational 
corporations technically fall within this group, but they have been separately designated in 
this study. All these processes are said to be driven by the processes of globalisation, for 
better or for worse. 
In order to keep a measure of authority within their SOA, states have responded to the 
system's transformation by channelling their authority of decision making into other entities. 
Intergovernmental organisations or IGOs are those organisations formed by two or 
more states who " ... work to promote voluntary cooperation among those governments on 
matters of shared interest. "28 A critical point about IGOs is that they do not have autonomy 
in decision making, as they exist based on the mandate of member states. Therefore, in 
theory, they cannot cha llenge states or their 'sovereignty.' Yet they do. If one looks at some 
of the functions of the European Union in particular, which will be examined shortly in detail, 
we find that it is an IGO in some areas. However, because it has surrendered some of its 
decision-making capabilities, a recurrent theme of this study, it does challenge the 
prevailing norm of IGOs. For this reason, the next section seeks to understand, at least on a 
basic level, the present construct of the European Union. 
Hybrid Nation - The European Union 
The EU, as an institution of order and governance, must be examined vis-a-vis the state as 
an indication or representation of change in the international political system. Change, in 
26 Rosenau, (2002), p20 
27 McCormick, op, cit. pS 
28 Ibid. 
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the study of international relations, is a concept that is not often considered. Yet it is a 
pertinent issue, especially when looking at post-Cold War order and governance. 29 
Categorising or concept ualising the institution of the European Union can be quite a difficult 
task, given its ever expanding nature and the constant changes experienced in the way 
decisions are made. Furthermore, it has evolved greatly from its inception, so, even that 
cannot serve as an adequate reference point for definition. In spite of these difficulties, this 
section will attempt to draw a picture. 
The EU seems very much like a conventional inter-governmental organisation. Members 
apply to join voluntarily, based on what they deem as shared visions; and in most 
instances, the EU cannot make arbitrary decisions without the consent of its members. Still, 
the EU exceeds what we know of the standard IGO. In those areas where the EU has been 
delegated authority by the states30 EU, laws override national laws and the so-called 
national interest for the interest of the Union as a whole. 31 One of the areas of delegated 
authority is perhaps one of the most important in external policy making: trade. The EU 
negotiates as one bloc on behalf of member states. McCormick suggests that this sort of 
cooperation is akin to supranationalism, which creates a new level of authority above the 
state with powers to make the state act. 32 
The debate has ensued as to whether the EU, given its powers, is a supranational institution 
or an intergovernmental one and this discussion is ongoing. We have established that it is 
more than the typical IGO, because of its mandate and the authority it has to fulfil that 
mandate. Yet, can we say it is a supranational institution or state? 
When explaining the 'demise' of the state, supranationalism is often highlighted as another 
cause of this collapse in addition to those already explored above. The EU is often defined 
by these established concepts. The current literature in the field is lacking in its provision for 
the possibility of a hybrid institution, an institution that one could say challenges the 
traditional functions of t he nation state as have long been defined in international relations 
theories as well as those of IGOs. Its ability to challenge the state however does not mean it 
29 Rosenau, James N. (1992). " Governance, Order and Cha nge in World Politics" in Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics. eds. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
30 New states accept that the EU has certain authority as a condition of joining 
31 McCormick, op. cit. p4 
32 Ibid., pS 
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is detrimental to the st ate. To be sure, the European Union does not fully exercise the 
powers of a supranational authority. In categorising the European Union, a new IR rubric is 
necessary. Because the EU is the first of its kind, there can be no standard set of 
characteristics for this sort of institution. For this reason, it is critical that we do not base 
our defin itions on the known, especially since the EU is still evolving, a moving target one 
might say. In it, we see at least two or three sorts of institutions in one entity. 
Aside from the EU not being just a supranational institution or an intergovernmental one, it 
is not a state, i.e. it is neither a federal state nor a confederal one and given the probability 
of expansion, it is not static either. The structure of this complex system, therefore has 
consequences for why certain policies have formed and others not. 
There are certain options of cooperation usually ascribed to the structure of the Union, 
stemming from the perception of where power and authority lie or how they are shared (in 
the state and by default the Union). The European Union exhibits aspects of confederalism 
in that its citizens still relate directly to the member-state as opposed to the Union; for the 
most part, the nations can still act on their own in many areas of foreign policy and there is 
no central government for the Union. 33 Furthermore, there is no common defence policy and 
the idea of being "European" as opposed to French or Danish is still in the starting phase . 
On the other hand, it also exhibits certain characteristics of a federal system. Two levels of 
governance in the tradit ional state sense, typifies this system: the national and the local. 
These two levels may exist with separate or shared powers; however, one authority does 
not supersede the other in certain areas of governance. 34 In the case of the EU we now 
ascribe local to national and the second level is still indeterminate. Usually a federal system 
consists of an elected government, common monetary policy, a national set of laws, an 
intricate bureaucracy and the ability to make treaties and a defence policy. Largely then, 
the European Union is not a federal entity, and yet, it has certain characteristics of such a 
state. It has a set of laws and treaties, which bind member states and citizens. On matters 
of intra-European trade, agriculture, the environment and social policy, EU law takes 
precedence as per the agreement of member states. The EU Parliament accounts for direct 
representation and it has its own currency, even if not all member states are part of the 
monetary system . 35 
33 Ibid. , pp8-9 
34 Ibid., p9 
35 Ibid. 
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Recently, a new term has come to describe how governance functions in relation to the 
European Union. Multi-level governance is "characterised by co-decision-making across 
several nested tiers of government, ill-defined and shifting spheres of competence (creating 
a consequential potent ial for conflicts about competences) and an ongoing search for 
principles of decisional distribution that might be applied to this emerging polity."36 Given 
this definition, one may conclude that attempts to pigeon-hole the complexities of the EU's 
governance system are inadequate for European policy studies, instead we could perhaps 
try to sort through the complexities as best as we can. 
From this explanation, we see that the EU is not an institution that fits into our usual 
rubrics. Instead, the EU must be viewed as a hybrid institution with no precise definition, 
and with operation on multiple levels. This institution may seem to challenge the notion of 
sovereignty in the traditional sense. Yet, if sovereignty has never actually reached its ideal 
potential, can we truly say the EU is challenging the roles of its member European states? 
Despite this, the changes that the advent of the European Union has caused to the member 
states and the way International Relations is studied cannot be ignored. This is the 
motivation for this study. Instead of adopting the attitude that the state is losing its 
authority, I argue that the state, in the EU, is changing and that change may not be as 
detrimental to the state although this seems to be the prevailing perception. State change is 
being examined by one of the most defining responsibilities of states, which is the ability to 
make their own foreign policies 
Conclusions 
The state is considered the core of international relations, especially when accounting for 
foreign policies. Despite many challenges to the state's authority, this assumption has 
remained true. The European Union, given some of its characteristics, is seen as one such 
challenge to the state. And because of those characteristics, it is critical to study within the 
field of International Relations, change and what it means for our understanding of the state 
and the international system with a new sort of institution. This institution is a hybrid 
institution one with new governance structures on multiple levels. While the implication has 
often been that any challenge to the state is harmful, the nature of the EU as it currently 
exists does not imply state erosion per se, but a change that necessitates adjustment while 
creating new relations, again, within the system, between each member state and Brussels. 
36 Marks, Gary cited in Smith, Andy. (1997). "Studying Multi-Governance. Examples from French Translations of 
the Structural Funds" Public Administration Vol. 75, pp711-729, p711 
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The outcome of policy relations between EU and member states will delineate what mode of 
cooperation the Union may practice while elucidating the possibility of further change. 
To understand these better with regard to the European Union, the next section will 
consider the creation and the functions of the Union, i.e. its structures. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Creating the European Union 
The Inception of the European Union: A Historical Trajectory 
The European Union had its formative years following the Second World War. In those early 
years, it is arguable that the most prominent proponent of some sort of European 
integration was British wartime leader, Winston Churchill. In his 1946 speech, he asserted 
that integration was a condition necessary to prevent war on the continent, although he 
implied at the same time that Britain was not to be part of that integration. 37 In May 1948, 
delegates from 16 European states, with American and Canadian observers, attended a 
conference at The Hague, called the Congress of Europe. 38 It is from this gathering that the 
Council of Europe was conceived, and in the next year the statute founding this body was 
signed in London by 10 European states. The Council had its headquarters in Strasbourg 
where it had a sizab le bureaucratic structure. This Council had some successes at 
cooperation, but did not fulfil the dreams of integration that the European federalists 
desired; at its best, it was a typical intergovernmental organisation. 
Stemming from the dissatisfaction with the Council, the idea to form a coal and steel 
community, linking Germany and France, was conceived. With these two countries tied 
together, there was the political hope that the arrangement would prevent the outbreak of 
future wars with the economic motivation that the cross-national merger of these two 
nations will do a great deal to boost the decimated economies of both countries. It was the 
brainchild of Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and Robert Schuman (1880-1963) French 
businessman and statesman respectively. On 9 May 1950, Schuman outlined the plan for 
the common coal and steel industries in a statement. In his speech he said, "World peace 
cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers 
which threaten it."39 Supposedly then, this cooperation was needed to guarantee peace. 
Scholars have asserted that the theoretical tenets of EU integration lie in functionalism; 40 
the extent to which this is true may help with the understanding of the logic of integration, 
as well as the supposed function of the Union. The aim of functionalism was to find an 
37 Churchill, Winston . (1946) "The Tragedy of Europe" in The European Union : Readings on the Theory and Practice 
of European Integration. (1994) . eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G . Stubb. Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, ppS-9 
38 McCormick, op. cit. pp63-4 
39 Schuman, Robert. "The Schuman Declaration" in The European Union : Readings on the Theory and Practice of 
European Integration . (1994) . eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, ppll - 12 
40 Rosamond, Ben. (2000) . Theories of European Integration. New York : St. Martin's Press 
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ordering for international society that would end wars and create prolonged peace. 
Mitrany's functionalism had a "technocratic vision of human governance."41 Ben Rosamond 
supports the argument that Mitrany's conception stemmed from his scepticism of the state 
as an agent of social change. 42 Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, subscribed to the 
functionalism of David Mitrany (1888-1975). 43 Monnet was calling for a change that needs 
to be central in our understanding of the EU. He was calling for something that had not 
existed because " ... one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national 
interest. "44 For him, like Mitrany, transnational institutions might fare better where national 
governments had failed . 
A part of that hope was fulfilled in 1951. On 18 April 1951, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was established when the Treaty of Paris was signed and the community 
began to function in August of the following year. The original membership consisted of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. While the 
establishment of ECSC was just a small step towards supranational integration, it was a 
huge step that, for the first time, states (both the people and the government) willingly 
ceded some of their aut hority and a measure of sovereignty to an institution that is not a 
traditional government, whose authority is not confined to any particular state. 45 
This initial step encouraged the formation of two additional bodies, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These new 
communities were form ed in 1957 under the Two Treaties of Rome. The aim of the EEC was 
to form a common market area between the initial six member states of the ECSC, reducing 
and then eliminating internal trade barriers and then forming a common external tariff; this 
then tied the fates of t hese countries together. In addition, it would encourage the free 
movement of people, capital and goods within the treaty area. From here, the European 
Community took on more social and political responsibilities. 46 
Despite its achievements, the Community did not include Britain, a former superpower, 
whose membership would lend greater legitimacy to the body. McCormick maintains that 
Britain was not opposed to cooperation, but was opposed to a cooperation that might create 
41 Rosamond, op. cit. p33 
42 Ibid. 
43 Monnet, Jean. (1962) "A Ferment of Change" Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1 pp203-211 
44 Ibid., p 
45 McCormick, op. cit. p67 
46 Ibid., p6 7 
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a strong supra-nation above the British state. In 1960, under the aegis of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), she was able to cooperate in and integrate with Europe to a 
minimal degree. 47 It must be noted that Britain was not the only country hesitant to follow 
the path of supranationality. France, a founding member of the European Community 
exhibited similar fears under General De Gaulle. Charles de Gaulle argued that each country 
had its own national personality that had to be preserved. By implication then, a 
supranational institution might tend to erode this personality. He added that cooperation 
could still take place at an intergovernmental level for the common good, through 
negotiations. 48 
In 1965 the three communities merged through the establishment of a single Council of 
Ministers under the Merger Treaty. 49 By 1986, the EC had its own distinct administrative 
structure, a body of laws and a responsive citizenry via the parliament, 50 and a common 
market, created to decrease and eventually eradicate tariffs and customs duties within the 
EC zone. The Single Eu ropean Act (SEA) Treaty was signed in February of that year and it 
created the framework for the European Monetary System, and an internal border and 
passport control where restrictions were to be lifted. It also made provisions for states to 
coordinate foreign policy initiatives that are more "European" than exclusively national in 
nature. In addition, a j udicial branch was empowered to override national judicial powers in 
certain instances. The treaty came to force in July 1987 after ratification by national 
legislatures of member countries. 
The SEA consolidated pr ior treaties of the community and added new provisions, especially 
with regards to the decision-making procedures of the Community. First, it allowed for the 
community to make regional policies pertaining to science and technology, where policies 
concerning the environment and economics were more explicitly stated. Laws within this 
policy sphere are therefore subject to community law, as states have relinquished these 
areas of policy to Brussels. In the second instance, the Treaty undertook to complete the 
creation of an internal market by 1992. The internal market would include the free 
movement of people and capital as a customs union had functioned within the member 
countries for sometime. Thirdly, it gave the Court of Justice more power. The Treaty 
47 McCormick, op. cit. p69 
48 De Gaulle, Charles. (1994). "A Concert of European States" in The European Union : Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration. eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G . Stubb. Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, pp25-41 
49 Nugent, Neill. (2000) The Government and Politics of the European Community. 2"d ed. Hampshire and London: 
Macmi llan p47 
50 McCormick, op. cit. p72 
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reprioritised political cooperation by giving legal status to the European Political 
Cooperation, a forum where member states can cooperate to form EU-wide policy as well as 
coordinate more on their national security and defence policies. 51 As part of the new powers 
gained by the Community, national law in the area of social welfare also had to be adapted 
to that of the community. This reflects again both the evolution of the community as well as 
that of the member state. 52 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty followed the SEA. 53 This treaty changed the European 
Community to the European Union (EU); it paved the path for a single currency zone, and 
allowed further integration to include more countries. 54 Like SEA before it, Maastricht went 
further in tying the fates of member countries together. Defined under three pillars, the first 
pillar of European Communities reiterated the areas of cooperation already established at 
intergovernmental and supranational levels. Under the headings of institutional and policy 
changes, new procedures were instituted. The legislative procedure under SEA reconfigures 
how decisions are made between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. 55 It is 
through Maastricht that the Economic and Monetary Union are outlined and the formation of 
the "timetable for establishing the EMU is specified."56 Here also, the European Central Bank 
is established as well as a European System of Central Banks to which member state banks, 
as well as some of those countries that have not adopted the Euro such as Iceland and 
Norway, are members. 
The second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty is the Common Foreign and Security Policy or 
CFSP. SEA expected that through the formalisation of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), a mechanism would be employed to ensure all member states followed closely, 
coordinated foreign policy patterns even if security issues were not going beyond the 
intergovernmental level yet. In Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, however, the EPC 
formalised by SEA, was replaced. Further revisions were made to this pillar in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, including the creation of an office for a High Representative, currently held by 
Javier Solana. This pillar would be examined in further detail in subsequent chapters as it is 
the most pertinent to this study. 
51 Ibid., p75 
52 It should be noted that in most cases, given the democratic nature of member states and the system of welfare 
in most European states, these changes were probably not momentous enough to indicate a "shake-up" of states. 
53 The Maastricht Treaty is formally called Treaty on the European Union. 
54 Ibid., p78 
55 Nugent highlights the precise procedures. 
56 Nugent, op. cit. p402 
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The third pillar entitled "Cooperation in the Spheres of Justice and Home Affairs" or "Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters" delineates what areas of internal security 
policies member states must regard, not just as a national concern, but as a concern of the 
Union. They include areas of immigration, police and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters among other policy areas. These measures must comply with the limits of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
Subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty, were the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the Treaty 
of Nice. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, some of the responsibilities of the third pillar, such 
as free movement of people, were moved to the first pillar. 57 The Treaty of Nice, which 
came into force in 2003, was instituted to amend all previous treaties, and its main aim was 
institutional reform wit hin the Union. Like many prior treaties, it drew rancour among 
members but this was settled to make the agreement effectual. The Treaty of Nice is the 
latest 'law' of the Union . 
Despite many achievements in cooperation that the current EU has gained to date, some of 
its unsuccessful attempts must be considered as they still have resonance. The success of 
the ECSC prompted those European federalists to seek further political integration between 
the countries through t he creation of the European Defence Community (EDC). Initially, 
Rene Pleven, then French Prime Minister, suggested a common defence in what is known as 
the Pleven Plan. Eventually, he put forth a proposal for the EDC and the draft treaty that 
was signed in 1952. It proposed "a Joint Defence Commission, a Council of Ministers, an 
advisory Assembly and a Court of Justice. "58 This bureaucratic structure was similar to that 
of the ECSC. Despite t he intention, this community was never formed for many reasons. 
One of those usually ci ted was the French's discomfort about fully rearming Germany. For 
this reason, the French parliament failed to ratify the treaty. There were also concerns over 
the loss of control of the national armies, and the failure of the British to participate would 
have rendered the community relatively weak. 59 In addition, the formation of the EDC 
foresaw a federalist Europe, an idea many were yet to accept. Although the EDC failed, 
seven European countries, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux 
had instituted an arrangement known as the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. The 
WEU, according to Nugent, was an arrangement that was "loosely structured, essentially 
57 "Pillars of Europe" EUROPA Glossary http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm 
58 Nugent, op. cit. pp39-40 
59 Ibid., p40 
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consultative, primarily defence-oriented ... [and] amongst other things, permitted West 
Germany rearmament subject to various conditions. "60 
The failure to form the EDC anticipated the continued difficulty that would be faced in 
adopting a common security or defence policy. The fears of the loss of sovereignty, if 
sovereignty is considered the ability to have control of one's security policy, is especially 
worth noting as it is a recurrent theme even now as scholars and other experts consider the 
future of the EU and its CFSP. Notwithstanding this failure, the signing of the draft treaty as 
well as the existence of the WEU, clearly illustrates that the state in Europe was evolving 
even within this sensitive policy arena. 
Of recent, another instance of failure was through the ratification process of a formal 
constitution for the Union. In an effort to address the democratic deficit so often criticised, a 
constitution was drafted to further entrench the powers of the EU. Unfortunately, in those 
states that held a national referendum, it was defeated much to the consternation of the 
countries' leaders. Despite progress made in the area of integration, many see this as 
backward step in the process of integration. Whether this is true is inconsequential 
especially for this study, as the author does not believe that the constitution would have 
made any effectual institutional changes. 61 The defeat of the constitution was a statement 
of the people for their respective governments to respond to their needs and alienation such 
as high unemployment, which gripped both France and Germany - both considered the EU's 
core members. 
The policy areas outlined in the various treaties that serve as the 'constitution' of the EU 
have necessitated the creation of bureaucratic agencies. The European Union's bureaucratic 
structure is quite visible with its main headquarters in Brussels. The next section will look at 
the core structures of the Union, as they affect certain areas of function in member states. 
The Structure of the European Union 
At least one consensus that can be reached about EU structures, is that they are quite 
complex. For instance, it is not easy to find out what particular structure is responsible for 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), even if we immediately eliminate the judiciary. The 
60 Ibid. 
61 In spite of the Constitution, the areas of CFSP and Defence and Security would have remained as they had been 
under the last treaty, the Treaty of Nice. 
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EU does not have corresponding sectors to member states although as we will see, when 
looking at country diplomats in Brussels, there is certain coherence to their function. 
There are five central institutional structures, often highlighted as the heart of the European 
Union, although they have various other attachments to them. This section will attempt to 
explain their basic funct ions and how those may relate to foreign policy coordination if there 
is any such link. 
The European Commission 
The European Commiss ion is a college of 20 members in charge of different portfolios such 
as institutional reform, regional policy, external relations, etc. 62 This body represents the 
executive and bureaucratic section of the EU. Unlike most national government structures, it 
does not necessarily have the power its description implies. In contrast to national executive 
counterparts, it has little power of implementation and in fact, according to Nugent, 
member states have t he charge of most daily administrative duties of the Union. 63 The 
members of the Commission are unelected but selected through a thorough process from a 
pool of highly qualified professionals. The task of this body is to "develop proposals for new 
laws and policies. [It] represents the interests of the European Union."64 There is the 
assumption that this body is neutral, or at least more so than some of the other sections of 
t he EU, since Commissioners do not represent their home states but particular portfolios on 
which the welfare of the entire Union depends. 
I n actuality however, every diplomat probably works to maximise the benefits for his or her 
own country and this is certainly a consideration if one takes into account the fact that each 
member country suggests a nominee from a pool of their top technocrats in a portfolio or 
portfolios they deem important to their interests. The Commissioners each serve five-year 
terms and their main responsibility is to make new policies based on EU laws as well as take 
t he final decisions on externally initiated law and policy proposals that may be forwarded to 
t he Council of Ministers. In addition, it is charged with the management of EU finances and 
has the authority to externally represent the EU in the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organisation, for instance through the relevant directorate and its director general. Those 
representations of the EU, in several countries, come under the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. The Commission has the authority to initiate laws, a power usually reserved 
62 McCormick, op. cit . p9 1 
63 Nugent, op. cit. p61 
64 McCormick, op. cit . p86 
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for the legislative arm of a governmental structure and it also shares decision-making 
powers with the Counci l of European Union. 
The Council of European Union 
The Council of European Union is the most powerful structure within the EU. Most of the 
policy decisions come from this body and it primarily champions the interests of the 
member states. 65 Minist ers that make up the Council are appointed from the governments 
of member states, i.e. all ministers from member states are automatically members. For 
instance, Jack Straw represents Britain in matters of Foreign Policy in the European Union 
within this council. In addition, the Council is the final decision making body in the Union, 
over and above the Commission and Parliament. The Presidency of this Council is held for 
six months by each member state on a rotational basis. 66 Members reach decisions through 
unanimity or qualified majority voting. 
About 24 technical councils make up the Council, the most important of which is the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). This is because the GAERC consists of 
member states foreign ministers to discuss those internal and external relations as well as 
other politically sensitive issues that will be the focus of this paper. With in the Council, the 
relevant Commissioner acts as an conciliator in between EU and state interests to state 
ministers so that each may consider EU interests in addition to national ones, chairs. It 
must be noted that it is not only this council that lobbies on behalf of their home 
governments. Indeed, many countries have permanent representatives in Brussels, such as 
the UKRep with his other assistants. These permanent representatives meet weekly in the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Council. 67 One criticism often levied against the Council, is that for the main decision-
making body of the Union, it is too secretive, lacking the transparency expected of 
democratic establishments. 
The European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) is supposedly the voice of the people and its aim is to 
address the so-called democratic deficit, at least in part. European voters directly elect 
members and they work closely with the aforementioned Council of European Union. 
Although it is the official legislative branch of the European Union, the EP cannot propose 
65 Ibid., p95 
66 The Council of the European Union Website http ://ue.eu .int/showPage.ASP?Iang=en accessed 20 Dec. 2005 
67 Ibid., p96 
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new laws, and is thereby lacking a major power of a legislative body. 68 Currently, the 
Parliament consists of 732 MEPs and is headed by Josep Borrell Fontelles who serves as 
President of the Parliament. The responsibility of the president is to chair debates and act as 
representative of the parliament to all the other core institutions in the Union. It has a 
single chamber and is elected by universal suffrage for a fixed five-year term. The last 
elections took place in June 2004. 69 Unfortunately, the European Parliament has yet to find 
a niche with the people they represent and perhaps that would explain why it has not been 
too successful in garnering more power for itself. Most Europeans would hold the 
Commission responsible for grievances against the EU, whereas in most national settings 
with parliamentary democracies, the legislature is largely held responsible for detrimental 
actions, along with the executive. The discussion of the European Parliament here is for 
introductory purposes to the structures that form the EU. However, one could argue that the 
limited role the EP plays in ensuring full accountability to the citizens of the Union translates 
to the non-committed nature of the current CFSP as will be addressed later. 
EU Legal Structure 
The legal structure of t he European Union consists of the Court of Justice, which seeks to 
clarify the meaning of European law. It comprises 25 Judges and 8 Advocate-Generals. 70 
The number of AG may be increased if the Court requests this from the Council. This court 
is headed by one of the Judges who is elected to the position of President for a renewable 
term of three years. 71 The Court of First Instance was formed to relieve the Court of Justice 
of some of its burdens. It has 25 Judges who should be from each member state; they are 
elected for six years, which is renewable. With cases heard in the Court of First Instance, 
they may only be appealed in the Court of Justice on the points of law that may have 
affected the outcome. 72 In November 2004, the Civil Service Tribunal was established as the 
first point of judicial contact when disputes in the European civil service arise. This tribunal 
consists of 7 Judges and follows the same review process as the Court of First Instance in 
which appeals can only heard by the aforementioned Court on matters of Law. 73 These are 
the three main judicial structures of the Union, although there is a Court of Auditors. The 
purpose of this entity is to hold the EU administrations accountable in spending; i.e. it 
68 Ibid., pp104-105 
69 The European Parliament Website http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/public/default_en.htm accessed 20 Dec 2005 
70 The Court of Justice of the European Communities The Court of Justice Website 
http:/ /curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index_cje.htm accessed 20 Dec 2005 
71 Ibid. 
72 "The Court of First Instance" The Court of Justice Website 
http:/ I curia. eu. i nt/ en/ i nstit/ presentationfr I index_ cje . htm 
73 Ibid. 
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gauges how the revenues of the community are spent and from what sources those 
revenues are derived; .indeed it is "the 'financial conscience of the European Union."74 
The European Councif 5 
The European Council, for its part, consists of "the head of states of member states, their 
foreign ministers and the president and vice-presidents of the Commission. "76 It was 
created in 1974 and serves like a board of directors to the EU. It was given formal status 
under the SEA. 77 The European Council is headed by the Head of the government of the 
state that holds the Presidency of the Council of European Union. He holds this office for six 
months. 78 Specifically, 
" ... the European Council provides the impetus for the major political issues relating to 
European integration: amendments to the Treaties and changes to the institutions, 
declarations on external relations in the context of the common foreign and security 
policy, etc. It also serves as a forum for top-level political discussion in crisis 
situations and it endeavours to resolve disagreements between Member States. "79 
Debates and opinions in the European Council often influence the policy processes in the 
Council of the European Union, since they have many of the same members and champion 
the same interests. 
In addition to these core structures, there are other 'attachments' or specialised institutions 
within the Union. These include the Committee of Regions, headquartered in Brussels, which 
allows local government officials from member states to meet and discuss matters relating 
to their citizenry. There is also the European Central Bank or ECB, which controls the 
economics and monetary policy of the Union. 80 There are other bodies such as the European 
Police Office (Europol) and the European Environmental Agency etc. These institutions, in 
addition to the five core ones, make up the complex bureaucratic structure of the European 
Union. 
74 ' European Court of Auditors" http ://www.eca.eu.int/index_en .ht m 
75 The European Council is not the same as the Council of Ministers, now called the Council of the European Union 
and should therefore not be confused. These institutions are also distinct from the Council of Europe which consists 
of states in the EU but is an external institution with 46 members including non-EU members 
76 Nugent, op. cit. p193 
77 "European Council " http://www .eu. int/european_council/index_en. htm 
78 At the time of writing, Presidency of the Council of Ministers and European Council was initally held by the United 
Kingdom 's Mr. Jack Straw and Mr. Tony Blair respectively (July-December 2005); Leadersh ip of the Union was 
subsequently transferred to Austria on 1 Jan 2006. 
79 " European Council " http://www.eu .int/european_council/index_en.htm 
80 McCormick, op. cit. 97 
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We see from the history of the EU, as well as the core institution, that it is quite a complex 
entity that has had some failure and successes in its formation. The success is categorised 
by the fact that the EU exists, although the initial failure of the EDC diminished the 
willingness to form a common defence policy for Europe. Most importantly, it is not an 
institution that can be relegated to the shadows of international politics, as many of its 
autonomous institutions have powers conferred to them by the member states and their 
citizens. The Union is currently 25 members strong, including former great powers, and 
other states are set to join in the coming years. 
The core entities of the EU play some role in the Union's external policy81 formation, with 
the European Council and the Council of Ministers (or Council of European Union) being the 
most influential in this regard. Within the Council of Ministers, especially the GAREC, Foreign 
Ministers negotiate a position for EU policy as a whole and reiterate their individual 
preferences for foreign policy within the international system. Members of this committee 
and their staff, form the networks within which pre-negotiations or informal negotiations 
take place, before the Council communicates a formal position at official meetings. 
A general background to the history of the Union and that of its most important structures is 
critical to understanding how the European Union interacts with member states. These daily 
interactions help member states determine what adaptations they need to make within 
national structures. In addition, it illustrates why institutional changes are necessary to 
maximise a state's benefits within the complexities of the Union's bureaucratic structure. 
81 External Policies incorporate general foreign relations with defence and security policies; they are considered 
twodistinct realms of policy. 
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PART 2: INTRODUCTION 
External Policy Making Within the EU - Trade, Foreign and Security Policies 
Cooperation in theE 
While the EU was not established to replace its member states, it has assumed many 
functions of a state, supplementing some of the daily functions of individual states. On 
policy issues such as social welfare and macro economic policy, there is cooperation among 
states with the necessary round of intergovernmental alliances and negotiations within the 
various structures. When it comes to the idea of political cooperation, however, member 
states often lack consensus because this is a sensitive area of cooperation, as will be shown 
later. The significance of this type of cooperation is important however, as the Union 
enlarges and the other aspects of daily life become more fused. Taking for granted that 
t here is one Frontier for international affairs, political cooperation is necessary for the 
ultimate success of the Union. While the Union members do attempt to form common 
political policies and decisions in some instances, the EU does not bind members. Sections 
within the various treaties governing political cooperation tend to be ambiguous and look to 
the future as a time when the EU will find a common foreign policy. 
Although states give t he European Union some of its powers and various aspects of their 
authority, they are unwilling to give up political authority. Political authority is often 
synonymous with the ability to provide security and defence within a particular political 
entity; it is a sovereign right. States would rather not cede this authority area to the Union, 
as this has implications for the exercise of sovereignty. Yet, further coherence is 
unavoidable if the European Union, as a whole, is to succeed. Within the structure, member 
states are looking at ways in which they can maintain authority while abiding by EU 
guidelines and function ing as part of the EU body. 
The state of literature, addressing these EU-State relations, has termed the phenomenon 
Europeanisation, as suggested in the introduction. Essentially, Europeanisation means " the 
institutional manifestation of the EU integration process in the form of decision-making 
processes and structures and administrative apparatus designed to formulate, 
implement and monitor policy and legal frameworks. "82 This is a two way process 
whereby states affect EU level policy and vice versa, although the way in which states 
influence EU level policy as a whole is typically not clear in the literature. It is true that the 
82 Major, Claudia. (2005). " Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining or Rescu ing the Nation 
State?" Politics Vol. 25 No. 3 p176 (emphasis mine) 
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current literature addresses the role of a particular country, in shaping a particular policy or 
issue.83 Yet, there is lit tle literature dedicated to how the state's adaptation to the Union 
continues to shape t he Union, especially in terms of foreign policy. Claudia Major's 
definition, especially the highlighted part, adequately represents that change has occurred 
in various governmental structures, especially since current member states ascended to the 
European Union, and t his will be a starting point of analysis. In essence, states are obliged 
to Europeanise because they have no choice. One assumption implied by Europeanisation 
literature is that these new structures are established to specifically preserve the national 
interest. Although this tends to be the goal of any state at any given time, it is not 
necessarily the crux of Europeanising. Having signed up for membership, several policy 
areas have been ceded to the Union and therefore, in those areas where Union laws take 
precedence over national ones, the policies have to be matched domestically to the 
preferences of Brussels . 
One cannot say the same for external policies, especially high politics and this is why this 
study is critical. To expect the same results of other policy areas treated by the 
Europeanisation literature will grossly misrepresent the facts since, in the first instance, 
external relations policy in the EU is one area that is quite different and is acknowledged as 
so. In addition, Europeanisation does not do enough to address state structures and 
coordination within those structures, even before those structures coordinate with Brussels 
and therefore cannot give a full picture of change vis-a-vis foreign policy analysis. 
The second pillar of t he Maastricht treaty, the CFSP, regulates the Foreign and Security 
policy of European Union and coordination of such policy amongst members. This pillar of 
informs foreign policy within the European Union by referring all matters of this nature to 
the Council for vote. 84 I t leaves NATO the responsibility to defend Europe. 85 The aims of the 
CFSP are listed in Article J of the Maastricht.86 Member states may also come to a joint 
agreement on specific issues, which are binding only through a unanimity vote. 8 7 It is very 
important to understand that the CFSP structure is intergovernmental in nature. One 
obvious fact therefore is that this area of policy is still within the ambit of the state. Despite 
83 Romsloe, B0rge. (2004) "EU's External Policy: Are Lilliputans Impotent or Potent- the case of crisis 
management in the Amsterdam treaty" Arena Working Paper, 
84 "The Institutional Structure of the Third and Forth Pillars" http:// www.dadalos-europe.org/int/grundkurs4/eu-
struktur 4.htm accessed 31 Jan 2006 
85 "Com~on Foreign and Security Policy" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Foreign_and_Security_Policy 
accessed 31 Jan 2006 
86 "Treaty on European Union : Title V" http://europa.eu.int/en/record/ mt/titleS.html accessed 31 Jan 2006 
87 Ibid. 
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this, the second pillar has empowered the Union for political action much more than the 
previous Political Union did. "There is clear emphasis on information, cooperation and 
arriving at a common position ... · Special institutional arrangements have been made 
especially for this pillar, the most important of which is the Political Committee. "88 
Therefore, the very nat ure of the CFSP jeopardises a structure of security for the EU that 
may be similar to the common trade policy structure. 
On a practical level, war in Iraq epitomises the shortcomings of the current policy. Indeed, 
the failure of the European Union to come up as a united community, shook the confidence 
of many regarding the future of the Union. At the time of invasion, the Council of Ministers 
had only 15 members, and only two of them were willing to support the United States in her 
bid to go to war against Iraq. 89 
Who Makes External Policies in the EU? 
To understand who makes foreign policy within the EU, perhaps it is useful to define foreign 
policy within this context. Brian White defines foreign policy as the " ... actions taken by 
governments which are directed at the environment external to their state with the 
objective of sustaining or changing that environment ... '130 This is a significant deviation from 
the Realist definition that simply categorises foreign policy as power relations between 
states. Within this definition, even those relations that member states undertake to 
influence the institution of the EU, is an instance of foreign policy and methods employed to 
achieve such aims will be termed foreign policy mechanisms. Indeed, states in Europe are 
still integral to foreign policy formation; however, it would be negligent not to examine the 
extent to which the existence of the European Union itself has altered the institutional 
foreign policy mechanisms of the states. 
Therefore, to answer the titular question, we maintain that states make foreign policy in the 
international system. "How", becomes the next logical question. How do 'they', who make 
external policy, achieve that aim? This is a more complex question when looking at the 
European case given the institution of the European Union. The following section will look 
first at who makes trade and foreign security or defence policies in the EU institution itself, 
88 Ibid. 
89 Borger, Julian and MacAskill Ewen . "A case for war? Yes, say US and Britain. No, say the majority" The Guardian 
15 February 2003, www.guardian .co .uk accessed 2 Feb 2006 
90 White, Brian. (2004). "Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe" in Contemporary European Foreign Policy, 
eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Helen Sjursen and Brian White. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications 
ppll-31 
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and in EU member states. Subsequently, we will examine those departments or 
bureaucratic sections of Britain and Sweden that make trade and foreign security policy for 
their respective states. In addition, this section will consider how those respective member 
states now function because of membership in the EU looking at trade and foreign policy 
decision-making . This part will also be looking at how they relate to Brussels and what they 
do there to make sure they are well represented as individual nations and as members of 
the Union. In employing new mechanisms to carry out foreign policy objectives, this thesis 
argues that the state in these cases has changed and is changing. 
This section, as already implied, will attempt to use foreign policy analysis tools where 
appropriate. These may deviate from the traditional national-foreign policy analysis tools 
because we must consider that not only have states changed on a practical level, but that 
this change presents certain intellectual challenges as well. 
European Union External Policy Making 
The Treaty of Europe or the Maastricht Treaty defines which areas of policy the European 
Union has jurisdiction over and how policy is to be decided in each of those areas. In the 
EU, the Commission, t he Council of the EU and the European Parliament (to a very small 
extent) take central part in the decision-making processes governing external policies of 
trade, diplomacy, secur ity and defence. One European Commission publication notes that, 
due to the fact that the Union consists of over 450 million people and contributes a sizable 
portion of the world's capital resources, it is a significant force in international relations and 
therefore, its external policy is important. 9 1 
Because EU policies are the amalgamation of the interests of member states, these actors 
are very important in decision -making processes (plural?). For this reason, one may assume 
that the Council of the European Union (formerly Council of Ministers) has a very prominent 
role in the formation of European Union external policy . The procedure of general EU policy 
formation consists of three main mechanisms: co-decision, assent and consultation as 
established by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first ensures that the Council and the 
Parliament have the same powers in certain policy areas such as education. However, the 
external policy mostly uses the mechanism of consultation. The consultation mechanism 
necessitates that the Council of Europe inquire about the Parliament's views on a particular 
policy decision but they are not bound by the Parliament's opinion . 
91 European Commission . (2004 ) . "A World Player: The European Union 's External Affairs " 
http :/ / europa .eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/47/en .pdf accessed on 28 Dec 2005 
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First, the Commission recommends a text to the Council and the Council sends it to the EP. 
When the proposal reaches the legislative office, it is taken to the legislative coordination 
unit, who then decides which of the Parliamentary committees the proposal should be taken 
to. Concerning the subj ect at hand, proposals concerning external relations would be under 
the jurisdiction of three committees: foreign affairs, international trade, and security and 
defence. Within each committee, the proposal is carefully scrutinised and a report is written 
asserting the position of the committee. More often than not, the Parliament adopts the 
position of the committee and this is relayed to the Council. 
Member States in the Making of EU External Policies 
In the European Union, the member states retain the authority to make foreign policy for 
their respective country . Due to the construct of the CFSP, they are the prominent actors in 
making external polices for the Union. I argue that the reason for this is that, in the final 
analysis, the notion of national interest still pervades the national representatives' 
understanding of how foreign policy should work, even for the common good and even 
when it is not completely clear what the national interest is - the idea is what appeals? In 
other words, while the Council attempts to carve out a policy for the Union, the foremost 
thought for the members of GAERC and COREPER is that their individual countries' views 
are represented. Of course, the democratic nature of the member states means that most of 
these countries would have similar, if not identical, views on issues of human rights - for 
instance even if the implementation of this consensus differs. However, when it comes to 
matters of foreign affairs, including security and defence, states find it difficult to 
compromise. 
The Council comes about its decisions through unanimity, a simple majority or a qualified 
majority voting system, where each member state's vote is weighed according to the 
population of that count ry; i.e. Britain has a higher consideration in votes (29) than Sweden 
(10) if a decision necessitates a qualified majority. 92 
Security, defence and diplomatic policy making in GAREC is conducted through 
intergovernmental bargaining. Therefore, in these areas of foreign policy, decision-making 
in the Union is determined by negotiations and coalition patterns among member nations in 
order that their preferences are continually represented. It is particularly interesting that 
92 Britain 's population is larger than that of Sweden 
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while international trade is considered a foreign policy appendage, it is an area that has 
been ceded to the supranationality of the Union. We will try to examine how this has 
happened and why this is so. Subsequently, using Britain and Sweden as case studies, we 
will look at foreign policy conduct in these states since joining the Union. Changes in 
mechanisms as well as new creations to accommodate for membership in the EU will reflect 
state change in the 21st century. 
We accept that, in general, the EU and its member states share foreign policy powers. But if 
states make foreign policy, what is the purpose or duty of the High Representative of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy? 
HR-CFSP93 
Javier Solana, who is t he Minister of Foreign Affairs for the EU, currently holds this office. 
The High Representative coordinates foreign policy in the European Union and is the 
Secretary General of t he Council of Ministers, as well as Secretary General for Western 
European Union (WEU) . He is also the President of the European Defence Agency. The HR-
CFSP presides over the Political and Security Committee of the Council of Ministers, with 
members consisting of political directors from member states' foreign ministries. 94 The EU 
Foreign Policy chief's main role is to help construct and implement the Union's foreign 
policy. In some instances, he is allowed to conduct foreign policy negotiations with third 
countries with the permission of the presiding Union president. The existence of this post in 
the European Union is indicative of how states must have reconfigured their foreign offices 
to accommodate Mr. Solana's position; in essence, some duties in member states' foreign 
offices need to be coordinated with Mr. Solana in order that the CFSP is functional and 
effective. 
As will be reiterated th roughout this study, the office of the High Representative is marred 
by the fact that the CFSP is not binding, as was evident in the decision to invade Iraq. Mr 
Solana has described some of the more difficult moments of this job as those times when 
member states do not agree with each other on how foreign policy must be conducted as 
was the case when Britain and France did not agree on Iraq. 95 
93 This section is based on Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia "Javier Solana" 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Solana accessed on 20 Mar 2006 
94 "Introduction" Harvard WorldMun, Belo Horizonte http://www.worldmun.org/2006/archives/02/espc.pdf accessed 
22 Mar 2006 
95 Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia "Javier Solana" http :/ /en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Solana 
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External Trade in the European Union 
Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, currently directs the European Union external 
trade policy. The Commission has a Director-General for Trade, currently David O'Sullivan, 
who makes the proposals concerning external economic relations to the Council and 
Parliament. Together, t he secretariat is called the Directorate General Trade and they are 
responsible for conducting trade negotiations, act as enforcers, and they are responsible for 
ensuring compliance by third countries in accordance to international trade accords. 96 In the 
Parliament, trade concerns the Committee of International trade. As with most foreign 
policies, the "role of the Commission as defined in the Treaty, especially Title IX, covers the 
initiation, negotiation and implementation of [trade policies, with] final decisions being a 
matter for the Council."97 In general, External Trade policy takes the form of consultation. 98 
Trade in the European Union is made up of several arrangements, including bilateral ones 
between the EU as a whole and non-member countries in Europe as well as in Africa (in 
places such as South Africa). 99 However, EU trade roles are probably the most prominent, 
as they vote as one bloc in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), because a common trade 
policy is in place. Because of this, it is critical that the trade ministers, from each member 
state, assert their preferences before Commissioner Mandelson puts his bargaining chips on 
the table for other states. 
The legal basis of EU's trade policy is Article 133 of the European Community Treaty. From 
this the Commission has the mandate to negotiate for the Union in consultation with a 
special committee, 'the Article 133 Committee', which is composed of representatives from 
all member countries as well as the European Commission. This Committee meets on a 
weekly basis in Brussels, usually Friday mornings, discussing a wide range of issues 
concerning trade and economics of the Union and its member states, as well as negotiating 
a strategy for the Union in organisations like the WTO. It is within this Committee, a semi-
informal one, that the Commission secures endorsement from member states. Then, 
officials from the Direct orate General for Trade go on to the Council of Ministers to secure 
96 Source: Mrs. EA Lalley, Brit ish Department of Trade and Industry through personal correspondence 
97European Commission, External Trade. 'What we do" 
http://www.eu.int/comm/trade/whatwedo/work/index enohtm accessed 29 Dec. OS 
98 As explained previously, th is decision making procedure necessities consultation with the Parliament. There, the 
corresponding committee writes a report and its recommendation on behalf of parliament to the Council. 
99 European Commission, External Trade 'Trade Issues : Bilateral Trade Relations, South Africa " 
http://www .eu 0 intjcom m/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/southafrica/index_en 0 htm 
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formal approval before the Commission goes on to negotiate the EU position wherever 
necessary. 100 
The 133 Committee meets at both full committee or titulaire level, and the level of deputies. 
Of those in the first category, they meet monthly except in August and they are responsible 
for the overall trade policy. Members of this committee are drawn from national ministries 
of trade, industry, finance and foreign affairs. Because the Committee is not technically a 
formal one, while votes are recorded, deliberations are not published. 101 
Other polices within the Union are determined during the Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGC) which occur every four years (the last being 2004), usually within the framework of 
Treaties. The function of these processes will be examined as we now look towards Britain 
and Sweden. There are loopholes in CFSP, which create a situation where Europeanisation 
cannot truly apply, but changes are occurring too and we see this in two states. Those 
loopholes help the CFSP maintain its intergovernmental organisational nature where the 
only obligation it demands of the member states is that they will attempt to have a common 
stance on foreign policy . Observing from the failure of the Union to come up a definitive 
stance on Iraq prior to the American led invasion, the CFSP is lacking in enforceability and 
reforms will be needed for the second pillar to truly ensure it is indeed a legitimate 
institution of governance within the European Union. 
100 European Commission, External Trade 'Trade Issues : EU and WTO" 
http: / /www.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newround/index_en .htm 




Whitehall in Brussels: External Policy Making since SEA 
On joining the European Community in 1973, foreign policy in Britain was set to change. 
One must keep in mind that Britain was initially reluctant to join the Union, and then joining 
was delayed by French antipathy. As mentioned previously, foreign policy is one area of 
policy in which states are most unwilling to compromise. To surrender this to any other 
entity, including one such as the EU would imply that the security of the state is inevitably 
compromised. In 1973 however, Britain acceded to the Union. If the rationale of liberal 
inter-governmental ism is accepted, 102 Britain joined the European Union to further her 
present national interests. For this reason, Britain's position as a large state has been 
detrimental in the formation of an effectual CFSP. A concrete CFSP can be seen as a step 
towards complete integration. Even before the second pillar came into existence, former 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's speech of September 1988 (barely two years after the 
SEA) clearly elucidates the Britons' position. In the speech, the then British Prime Minister 
reiterated that the British government would resist any attempt to cede British powers to a 
"superstate."103 Because of the British reluctance, despite identifying the benefits of 
membership, it is said that Britain is an "awkward partner"104 who has an "uneasy 
relationship" with the rest of Europe. 105 
The British state possesses certain characteristics that would justify its reluctance to cede 
certain powers. The Brit ish have a very close relationship with their former colonies. These 
colonies are mostly poor countries and arguably require resources, a bulk of which the 
British government provides. That very relationship that ties Britain to these (mostly poor) 
countries, also ties her to another former colony who just happens to be the most powerful 
nation in the international system - the United States of America. These relationships form 
a significant portion of British foreign policy priorities that could explain reluctance at a 
concrete CFSP. Britain's foreign policy has a tradition of supporting the Atlantic alliance even 
when most of Europe would not, as is evidenced in the decision to go to war in Iraq. One 
102 Veracauteren, Pierre. (2001). "European Integration and the Crisis of the State" Queen 's Papers on 
Europeanisation No. 7 
103 Thatcher, Margaret. " A Family of Nations" in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of 
European Integration. (1994) . eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, pp45-50 
104 George, S. (1998). An Awkward Partner, 3'd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, cited in Blair, Alasdair (2004) 
"Britain and the European Union: The Impact of Membership" British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
Vol. 6 pp584-590 
105 Kaiser, Wolfram. (2002) . "A never-ending story: Britain in Europe" British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, Vol. 4 No. 1 pp152- 165, p153 
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other characteristic of Britain is that is it a large state in terms of population, economy, 
political influence etc. Indeed, it is a former great power and although not deluded by the 
glory of past grandeur, she is nevertheless hopeful that Britain can be a formidable leader in 
Europe. In addition, Britain holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council 
with the power to veto. At present, the United Kingdom does wield a considerable amount of 
power. Therefore, to lose a permanent hold on foreign policy is to jeopardise the power and 
authority accumulated thus far. Unfortunately, as an influential state, the British also realise 
that being out of the EU structure is probably even more harmful to their goals.106 
Therefore, in the 2005 introduction to "The Guide to the European Union" Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw wrote " ... given the importance of the EU to our interests it is vital that Britain is a 
leading power in Europe - so that we can seek to shape Europe in our interests, as 
vigorously as do the EU's other sovereign nations."107 The second section of Mr Straw's 
statement clearly indicates the aspirations of Britain to mould EU in its image as opposed to 
the other way round. 
Membership in the Union, however, precludes not acquiescing to the demands of integration 
of which the CFSP is a part. Consequently, the foreign policy mechanisms of the United 
Kingdom have changed as the state makes its policy as a member of the Union. Even as 
they make policy without consideration for their membership in the Union to their other 
commitments, such as those former colonies and the United States, membership in the 
Union must take precedence in decision-making but again, as we saw with Iraq, there is 
difficulty in coordinating an inter-governmental common stance concerning foreign security 
policy. 
Before we come to that however, we find that the Blair government in particular has 
launched the most progressive changes to the British institutional composition. The 1997 
manifesto of the current British administration promised to change the institutions of the 
nations in how they relate to their EU partners by fusing correspondences between 
Westminster and Whitehall as well as devolving powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The culmination of these proposals would be a massive decentralisation of the 
British government. 108 It is critical to understand that while devolution is an internal action 
106 Straw, Jack " Introduction: The Guide to the European Union" Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
http:/ /www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front/TextOnly?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Sh ... accessed on 23 Dec 2005 
107 Ibid. 
108 Bulmer, Simon and Burch, Martin. (2004) "The Europeanization of the UK Government: From Quiet Revolution 
to Explicit Change" Paper prepared at the ESRC/UACES conference on Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain: The 
Europeanisation of British Politics? 
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undertaken by the British government. However, the interactions of devolved 
administrations in Scotland and Wales to the EU add an extra element to British foreign 
policy institutions. The FCO must now coordinate with those devolved administration since 
some authority have been transferred from London to Edinburgh and Cardiff respectively. 
In the field of internat ional relations, the rigid division between the domestic and the 
international is no longer necessary, in some cases almost impossible. This is especially so 
in the case of the European Union, where the two converge i.e. domestic, is now 
international and vice-versa. Representatives from the Treasury, the Foreign Office as well 
as the Prime Minister's office and the Permanent Representation to the EU (the UKRep), 
formed the first hub of UK-EC/EU partnership. The initial change represented those 
ministries directly affected by membership in the community and this was the trend that 
was adopted with each successive treaty that assumed more supranational powers. 109 
Overall however, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Britain (FCO) now has the 
responsibility for communication between London and Brussels under whom the office of the 
UKRep, who conducts inter-governmental foreign policy cooperation and EU developments 
functions. The UKRep is the core foundation of UK EU Foreign Policy, feeding intelligence 
and policy advice to Whitehall to communicate to the other cabinet offices. 110 The current 
UKRep is Sir John Grant and he represents Britain in COREPER II. The Deputy 
Representative, the Representative to the Political and Security Committee and the Military 
Representative to the EU, assists him in managing his duties. The office of the UKRep has 
eight sections, the one most pertinent to this study being the External Relations, 
Development and Trade Policy. 
Given the nature of this study - we are dealing primarily with high politics and thus, 
excluding development policy. The following sections will endeavour to tackle the 
Department of Trade, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
the Prime Minster's Office, and changes111 that have occurred since joining the EU, 
indicating change in the British state. 
109 Ibid., p6 
110 Gomez, Ricardo et al. (May 2003). "European Union Policy Making in the UK: A Brief History. " Manchester Paper 
in Politics, European Policy Research Unit, 
http://www .socialsciences. manchester. a c. u k/ pol itics/pu blications/working_pa pers_docs/ma nchester _working_pa pe 
rs/MPP072003.pdf accessed on 21 Oct. 2005 
111 One obvious indication of change is the slight amalgamation of these departments under the FCO 
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Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Ian Pearson is Britain's current Minister of State for Trade, a position he holds jointly within 
the DTI and the FCO. His responsibilities include Europe and world trade policy as well as UK 
trade and investment. 112 In this context his office, along with the UKRep's office, organise 
expert bureaucrats to represent the United Kingdom at the Article 133 Committee 
gatherings. The first position for a Minister of State in the DTI was created in 1995 in 
response to the enlargement of the Union and continued necessity for coherence between 
departments on behalf of Britain in spite of the EU . However, it was not until the 
appointment of the current Minister that the position officially meant a joint appointment 
with FCO and DTI. One obvious implication of this is that European control of trade, as an 
aspect of external policy, is important enough to be overseen by the FCO, along with 
security and defence. While Trade concerns might not be as important as security issues, 
which concern the FCO, its position within this ministry demands considerable attention. 
The DTI as a whole has changed significantly in the manner in which business is now 
conducted. The fact that trade is now conducted on behalf of the Union as a whole, is the 
primary reason for that change, and therefore, the duties of Mr. Pearson are justified. A 
question that arises from this is: why has this particular foreign policy area ceded to the 
Union while most security and defence options remain under the aegis of national 
governments? The British government, for its part, has defended this arrangement as 
essential to the state's " interest." In this case, it is believed that a larger voting bloc such as 
the EU will adequately represent the interest of the state than if the state were apart from 
the Union when it comes to world trade. 
Ministry of Defence 
The British Ministry of Defence or MoD also works in conjunction with the FCO, now even 
more so since the establishment of the EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
which was added to the CFSP. The ESDP supposedly strengthens the CFSP to aid the EU in 
playing a more comprehensive role in crisis management as one bloc in the international 
system. It does not create a standing army, as the decision to deploy units is still the 
prerogative of each nation. 113 
112Department of Trade and Industry. Ministerial Team: Ian Pearson 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/ministers/pearson.html accessed 4 Jan 2006 
113 In actuality regarding the st rength of the ESDP, under the Helsinki Headline Goal, deployment of troops is 
voluntary 
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Interestingly, although not surprisingly, the MoD seems to have preference for a close NATO 
alliance, on the conditi on that the role of European stakeholders is strengthened. This is 
much more than it does to the ESDP; a reflection of Britain's other foreign policy 
commitment that precludes it from wholeheartedly accepting a CFSP. Indeed, a MoD report 
of 2003 puts more emphasis on strengthening NATO - certainly, the ESDP will not be an 
alternative as long as t his is the British stance. In spite of the changes that MoD has 
endured then, in respect to closer coordination with the FCO, the institution has not seen 
significant change despite membership in the EU . Without a doubt, its changes are not 
comparable to that of the DTI for instance. At the risk of redundancy, it is important to note 
that this again reflects the jealous nature of Britain or any large state for that matter, 
regarding the control of its external security policy and the avenue that carries out that 
policy. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Prime Minister's Office 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw currently heads the FCO. As already mentioned, it has the 
overall coordination of British EU policy through its European Union Department, which 
liaises with the UKRep office as well as the Prime Minister's office, where the Cabinet Office 
European Secretariat (COES) deals with British EU affairs. In the EU structure the Foreign 
Secretary represents the British government in GAERC as well as in the Council of Ministers 
and the European Union Council. 114 
While initial membership in the EU added more responsibility to the FCO's portfolio, some 
argue that the FCO's power is waning specifically because of the EU. 115 The establishment of 
other external policy adv isory bodies, as well as seeking information towards other informal 
networks, have contributed to this. 116 While it may be true that there are other organs 
emerging, this only lends credence to the far-reaching effects of membership, and how this 
reflects change in the state. We see that the FCO still takes lead in the coordination of IGCs, 
where most external policy preferences are negotiated. Within the FCO is the European 
Policy Committee, a ministerial committee representing most aspects of government, with 
t he view to address whatever policy area is affected by the UK's EU membership; it is 
chaired by the Foreign Secretary. The representatives from this committee coordinate with 
t he Cabinet's Ministerial Committee on European Strategy, chaired by the Prime Minister 
114 In the European Union Council, each state is also represented by its President or Prime Ministers and his or her 
deputy. 
115 Blair, Alasda ir. (2004) . " Diplomacy : The Impact of the EU on Member States" in Contemporary European 




where its goal is to "oversee the Government's European strategy and the presentation of 
the Government's European policy. " 117 In these two ministerial committees, although not 
officially a member, the UKRep is· often in attendance. In this way, the UKRep is kept 
abreast of almost all aspects of the UK bureaucratic function, including foreign policy 
preferences. 
Within the ambit of t he office of the Prime Minister, the European Secretariat exists -
currently headed by Kim Darroch; she serves as primary advisor on the EU to the Prime 
Minister. Through weekly meetings with the Prime Minister and senior officials from 
Whitehall, Britain's EU policy is coordinated. (Note: the UKRep is considered a senior 
Whitehall official). 
Office of the UKRep 
The United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the European Union is perhaps the most 
v isible form of change in the British government. The UKRep is formed by a wide variety of 
civil servants from different departments in the British Cabinet. Of particular importance to 
t his study are the following portfolios: representative to the political and security 
committee, the military representative and the external relations representative to the EU. 
These representatives are attached to the FCO, including the military representative 
(although possibly in a j oint capacity with the MoD). 
Within the UKRep's office, there are different geographical representatives, that is, persons 
who are career experts in different regions of the world. The presence of these experts 
leads one to believe that the representatives not only work in the UKRep to determine EU 
policy from the British perspective, but to determine British external policy from an EU 
perspective. This is the crux of change within foreign policy making in Britain. To what 
extent th is is done is quite questionable, but the consideration cannot be ignored. 
Devolution in the United Kingdom: What does this mean for external relations to 
the EU? 
Devolution means that certain autonomous powers have been given or " devolved" to certain 
regions in a particular state, in this case, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although 
devolution was an internal structural change, it was to an extent prompted by further 
integration and it has in turn affected external relations of Britain to the EU. 
117 Ministerial Committee on European Un ion Strategy. The Cabinet Office 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/eus.asp accessed 16 Feb. 2006 
- 40 -
In "Britain and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy"118 Keith Robbins discusses the effects 
of devolution on Foreign Policy. He argues that although the initial effects of devolution 
might not be felt, t here are certain long-term implications for this new form of 
government. 119 As Robbins points out, British foreign policy is often concerned about "British 
interests" a phrase that is often disputed, due to the ambiguity of interest. In spite of this, 
there has been no dispute as to the "Britishness" of foreign policy from the three nations 
within Britain itself. 120 The establishment of devolution might change this however. 
Since legally, there is still a United Kingdom, Scotland, as a devolved nation cannot have 
seats in the EU, but it can be influential in foreign policy decisions taken by Britain in 
relation to the EU . For instance, if the EU did not exist as an entity, it is not far-fetched to 
assume that there would be no argument as to London being solely in charge of foreign 
policy. 
Currently however, as the devolved powers' representation in Brussels shows, foreign 
diplomatic and security policy is still an area rigidly within the control of the British national 
government. 
Conclusions: State Change in Foreign Policy Mechanisms of the British Government 
Foreign policy mechanisms in the British government have changed due to institutional 
adjustments necessitated by membership in the EU. Particularly, the bureaucratic structure 
of the government in t he last ten to fifteen years has encountered a notable metamorphosis 
especially within the executive, the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
The foreign policy decision-making procedures that have been employed since accession to 
the European Union, have initiated processes within the Executive - such that organisation 
and routine have had to change. For instance, once weekly, it is necessary for senior 
members of the FCO t o meet with the COES, concerned representatives from the UKRep's 
office (in this case possibly the representatives to the Political and Security Committee), the 
Military Representative, External Relations representative concerning the ESDP and 
others. 121 At these meetings, the UK reaches a preliminary position. This position is then 
118 Robbins, Keith. (1998). " Brita in and Europe: Devolution and Foreign Policy" International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 
pp105-117 
119 Ibid. , p106 
120 Ibid. 
121 Gomez et al. op. cit 
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communicated to Europe to aid in forming a common EU policy, but not only that; it is 
communicated to inform the other countries on the general position of the state. 
In the past, many of the officials that arrived at these meetings came from the various 
departments within the already established British executive. In the last 15 years however, 
it was decided that it was necessary to have a strong diplomatic presence in Brussels, which 
was done by strengthening the UKRep's office. This has meant the creation of a European 
Staffing Unit that recru its for the purpose of British policy coordination with the EU . Further 
expertise is now demanded by membership, especially within those areas of foreign 
security, diplomatic and trade policies. These people do not work solely within the 
representative's office but within the EU structure itself. For instance, Peter Mandelson is 
t he EU commissioner in charge of Trade and he is British - wh ile his portfolio is for that of 
t he entire Union, as mentioned when considering the Commission, Britain's interest cannot 
be far at heart. 
One interesting element of these meetings is that given the structure of the UKRep's office 
where the officials, although British nationals, can be divided into those that represent 
Britain and those that represent Britain within the EU mandate, membership in the Union is 
a priority consideration . This is the case even on those matters where the Prime Minister's 
office has more or less agreed to go it alone. As was the case with the War in Iraq, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair did indeed attempt to convince the other member nations of the 
European Union that it was in their interest to be all ied with the United States invasion and 
ousting of Saddam Hussein; this was his attempt to influence EU wide policy from a British 
standpoint. Because the CFSP is only a tool to encourage coord ination in foreign security 
affairs, the UK was able to ally with the United States without any repercussions per se from 
the EU as an institution, although relations soured with certain member states such as 
France. 
British embassies have taken a more proactive role in policy formation, including foreign 
security, leaving their t raditional role of diplomacy to inform corresponding domestic foreign 
ministries while reinforci ng the British position on whatever is on the country's agenda. 
The most important implication of change in the Brit ish state is the tremendous devotion of 
many ministries to ensure the interests of Britain are met; and in no other sector, but 
foreign security and defence policy is this most emphasised. In addition, the time pressure 
- 42 -
necessitated by European Union structures mean that the FCO starting point of negotiation 
is not necessarily the beginning of the entire process, which is now preceded by a pre-
negotiated stance in the UKRep's office for instance. 122 
SWEDEN 
Non-alignment and Foreign Policy in the EU 
When Sweden applied for membership in the Union, it became internationally newsworthy, 
especially in the realm of foreign relations because it is generally characterised by her non-
alignment policy; it is part of her national identity. The Swedes were quick to clarify any 
implication of compromising this national identity by reiterating the fact that this non-
al ignment policy applies particularly to military action, a point that was noted by the 
Swedish permanent representation in Brussels. 123 Specifically, he argued that the initial . 
rejection of membership in the EU back when it was still the EC, went to the perception that 
t hat the institution was similar to NAT0. 124 Two observations arise from this perception. The 
one is that like every state, Sweden is very protective of its external security relations. The 
second observation is li nked to one of the main reasons for the Swedish study - it is a small 
state. Through casual observation, we can say, the United States of America is in charge in 
NATO, due to its position as a large state and its mil itary and economic might among other 
reasons; it therefore tends to dominate the influence of other member states. Likewise, for 
Sweden to join the EC, t he possibility was that it could be obliterated from the international 
scene by larger states li ke the UK, France and Germany. 
As aforementioned, Sweden is pertinent to this study because it provides another 
perspective of the possibility of change, this time in a smaller state. Traditionally, foreign 
policy theory argued that smaller states tend to align their choices based on the system's 
structure. By all accounts then, it is conceivable that after much resistance, Sweden 
acquiesced to joining t he Community as its expansion and function was shaping the 
international system too.125 Membership in the EU has necessitated changes in the structure 
of government marking a change in the governorship of the state in the area of external 
policy relations of diplomacy, security, trade and defence. The subsequent sections will look 
at how those changes have occurred . Furthermore, we will look at how changes have 
122 Bla ir b, op, cit. p207 
123 "Sweden and Europe" Pierre Schori Interview : Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC 
Berkeley http:/ /globetrotter.berkeley .edy/ people4/Schori/schori-con3.html accessed on 23 Dec 2005 
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125 Sundelius, Bengt. (1994) . " Changing Course : When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community" in 
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affected Sweden as a small state and what implications those have for the Swedish state 
and its external relations. 
Dilemmas of a Small State 
Amry Vandenbosch defi es a small state as a state that "is unable to contend wars with the 
Great Powers on anything like equal terms. " 126 He further asserts that those considered 
weak states127 play an insignificant role in world politics. Indeed, one could say the small 
states themselves accept this definition. If one looks at Sweden, it could be argued that she 
chose her military non-alignment position not to have to face the humiliation of being 
usurped by a great power such as Russia or Germany. Furthermore, we find that even 
within the European Un ion, Sweden specifically strives for secondary areas of foreign policy 
primarily, development aid and human rights justice. This is not to say she too is not 
concerned about the security aspect of external relations, as we will see later. Nevertheless, 
one can conclude that, t hat area of policy Sweden believes it can influence, and where most 
of its efforts are positioned, is not necessarily security. 
Size has always been an integral part in the study of international politics. It is "one of three 
'genotypic' variables assumed to exert major influence in foreign policy. "128 As we have 
already alluded to, there are certain general assumptions made of small states when it 
comes to foreign policy formation. They include: low levels of participation in international 
affairs; high levels of involvement in IGOs; support for international law norms; avoiding 
the use of force; conti ued attempt to not alienate greater powers; narrow geographical 
range of function in foreign policy; and habitually the moral conscience of the other states in 
the international system. 129 As Maurice East points out however, this is often the 
assumption if one believes that small states utilise the same decision making mechanisms 
as do large ones. He challenges the prevailing belief that a small state is not different from 
a larger one, it is just smaller but its functions are essentially the same. 
Although East adds va luable insight to reconsidering small states, his conclusions are not 
satisfactory. One reason for this is that the assertion that small states are not much attuned 
to warning signals that call for action in the international system is not wholly true. He 
126 Vandenbosch, Amry . (1964) . "The Small States in International Politics and Organization" Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 26 No. 2 p294 
127 Weak states in this context means small states as opposed to collapsing or failing states 
128 East, Maurice. (1973). "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models" World Politics Vol. 25 No.4 
p556 quoted from James Roseau 's "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Approaches to Comparative and 
International Politics ed. R.B. Farrell Evanston, Ill pp27-92 
129 Ibid. I p557 
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justifies this claim to explain why their range of function is much narrower than that of large 
statesY0 
The initial decision of Sweden not to join the EU was not because it was not attuned to the 
benefits of the system but it might well have been the opposite; Sweden was acutely aware 
of the possible disadvantage of joining initially. However, by the 1990s, the state 
reassessed the situation and the benefits of membership outweighed the possible 
disadvantages. To mitigate the disadvantages that may accompany membership in the 
Union, the Swedish state has had to endure change in the governance of its foreign policy 
structures since membership in the European. Let us now examine how. 
Understanding External Security Relations in Sweden 
It would be a grave mistake to assume that the role of small states like Sweden in 
international security affairs is non-effectual in comparison to that of larger states; to be 
sure their roles are smaller but hardly inconsequential. In "EU's External Policy: Are 
Lilliputians Impotent or Potent :- the case of crisis management in the Amsterdam treaty?" 
B0rge Romsloe assumes that states, including small ones, are quite rational and their ability 
to act, not only in interest but also with the ability to justify their position, makes them 
effectual in security policy making. 131 
In this paper, Romsloe studies the roles that Sweden and Finland played in strengthening 
the CFSP in the Amsterdam treaty, by instigating a crisis management command for the 
WEU but leaving territorial defence out of the European Union framework. It is interesting 
that the Swedes would pursue a security agenda for the EU, contrary to that of big states 
for fear of isolation if one assumes the conventional explanations of big state - small state 
action . Why did they do it then? Moreover, why did the other countries accede during the 
I GC? One can deduce from this instance that traditional foreign policy norms that assume 
that smaller states will always bend to the will of the system can be proven wrong . In the 
new era of the European Union, under which the European System exists, changes are 
occurring that challenge our understanding of state behaviour. 
All things being equal, it is conceivable that the Swedish and Finnish government threatened 
to veto a policy proposal within the WEU framework that would be similar to NATO's to the 
130 Ibid. 
131 Romsloe, op. cit. 
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effect that mutual assist ance must be guaranteed if any member of the EU is attacked. 132 To 
conclude then, Sweden's alliance with Finland to attain favourable concessions in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, nullifies the conventional belief that small states do not play a large role in 
foreign politics. Indeed, this case shows that new constructions in the international system, 
such as the existence of the European Union and membership in the institution, require 
change and adaptability that is beneficial to the foreign policy objectives of the state, even a 
small state. In addition , it seems that Sweden is garnering more influence for itself in the 
realm of "high" politics and this requires that the state make arrangements in its 
bureaucracy to accommodate this. 
Sweden, guards her non-alignment policy jealously. As to whether this policy is actually an 
accurate reflection of the Swedish state, since joining the EU is an interesting point for 
discussion. Also, can this be compatible with the added influence from membership in the 
Union? 
Despite Sweden's non-alignment policy, its Ministry of Defence has embarked on some 
changes since ascension to the EU. One significant instance of such change is the inclusion 
of Sweden in a rapid response team as part of the ESDP. Sweden has an important role to 
play within the European Security strategy as a member of the Nordic Battle Group (NBG), 
a rapid response team with three other nations. The NBG is made up of Estonia, Norway 
and Finland. By format ion then, Sweden has already aligned itself, albeit with one EU 
member state. It is important to note that Finland also has a similar non-alignment policy 
to that of Sweden. Within this alliance, Sweden is known as the "framework nation" which 
translates to leader. It has been argued that the creation of the NBG was to delay or avoid 
active participation in t he ESDP and at the same time not forsaking the security of the 
Nordic countries. 133 
The conservative parties see the changes in Sweden's foreign policy, as a member of the 
EU, as a natural progression of integration, while the more liberal ones are certain it will 
erode their national identity of neutrality. 134 Sweden's foreign policy decision-making is 
complicated by the fact that the parliament seems to have just as much input, if not more 
as the executive in this area. To this, government has to submit proposals to the legislature 
132 Ibid. 
133 Eliassen, Johan. (2004). "Traditions, Identity and Security: the Legacy of Neutrality in Finn ish and Swedish 
Security Pol icies in Light of European Integration" European Integration Online Papers Vol. 8 No. 6 
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before decisions can be arrived at. 135 There is a potential for fluctuation of foreign policy 
preferences, more so now, depending on which side of the political spectrum holds the most 
seats in parliament. In addition to those changes brought on by the NBG, the process with 
foreign policy has changed parliament as they become more institutionalised with more 
bureaucratic committees such as the Swedish EU Committee, which consists of 
representatives from all political parties represented in parliament. 136 
Whereas the Swedish state has been able to garner some power as a member of the 
European Union with that however, it has had to forfeit its non-alliance stance. Although 
Sweden often participates in UN humanitarian peacekeeping relief, new arrangements 
between the European Union and the United Nations means that the security council does 
not need to be consulted for the Swedish forces to be used in common security and defence 
initiatives. This is contingent on adherence to the UN Charter. What this means is that 
Sweden cannot always choose to be neutral. 137 There is justified fear that in allowing this 
area of policy (even a small area) to be under the control of the EU, there is a chance that 
Sweden encounters all t hat she had avoided by not joining NATO - being overshadowed by 
the larger states. 
In Sweden, EU policy-making is within the ambit of the Prime Minister's office, governed by 
the State Secretary and the European Policy Coordination Unit. Regarding foreign policy, the 
state decides its position in concert with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry for Trade, where the Ministry for Foreign Affairs European Union 
Department carries out the day-to-day activities of Swedish priorities within the EU. In 
addition, there is also a Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, which 
is considered an extended arm of the Swedish government. This mission is considered 
Sweden's largest abroad, with 8 attaches representing the Ministry of Defence alone. 
Swedish operations, as a member of the EU, are considered governance within a multi-level 
continuum. 138 Within Sweden, as with possibly all member states, the organisational 
dynamics, that now function between Stockholm and Brussels, necessitates a "decision-
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Supra note 131; the significance of this step is that the EU now has a crisis management capacity if not in 
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making [system] through a complex web of EU committees, the system of seconded civil 
servants, through embassies, as well as multi-level networks of civil servants."139 
Trade in Sweden 
Trade in Sweden is coordinated in the Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communication. Here there are three Ministers for Industry and Trade, Communications and 
Regional Policy and Employment. The current Minister for Industry and Trade is Mr. Thomas 
bstros who also heads the entire ministry. A total of six officials from the Ministry are 
stationed at the permanent representation in Brussels, where they coordinate day-to-day 
EU demands with the Ministry in Stockholm. 140 Together with the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, they coordinate Sweden's stance on trade and competitiveness within the EU since 
most external trade policies are now the responsibility of the EU Commission. 141 This sort of 
intra-governmental cooperation, between foreign affairs and the ministry of industry, is a 
product of membership in the Union. 
The Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union 
Accommodating the European Union in the Swedish state has necessitated, like other 
states, a Swedish permanent representation to the European Union. 
Sven-Oiof Petersson heads the office of the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 
where he bears the title of Ambassador, although there is an Ambassador who represents 
Sweden in Brussels as the Swedish representation to Belgium. This office is attached to the 
Foreign ministry with Counsellors coordinating Swedish position in the GAERC, COREPER I 
and II, and the European Council. Within this office, there is a special Foreign and Security 
Policy department with an Ambassador for Sweden to the PSC and a counsellor in charge of 
external relations. 
Within this arm of the Swedish government, EU policy is coordinated. In addition, similar to 
almost any permanent representation, the office plays an integral role in the formation of 
other Swedish foreign policy, which used to be largely the domain of the Ministry for Foreign 
139 Larsson, Torbjorn and Trondal, Jarle. (2005). "After Hierarchy? : The Differentiated Impact of the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers on the Domestic Executive" Arena Working Paper No.22 
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Affairs. Membership in the European Union has demanded this restructuring of the Swedish 
state. 
Ministry of Defence 
The Swedish Ministry of Defence has a moderate representation in Brussels also through the 
office of the Permanent Representative. It is with the help of this representation that 
Sweden became the framework nation for the NBG. It must be noted that this Ministry in 
particular is evolving its armed forces from a strictly defence force due to its non-alignment 
policy to "a mobile, flex ible operational defence, which can both defend Sweden and take 
part in international operations."142 The department website specifically notes that changes 
have occurred within the ambit of the ministry in relation to the European Union, especially 
concerning crisis management. 143 That a government department, while it tries to preserve 
its status as an independent state, is bold to proclaim the changes effected by accession to 
another institution, is a reflection that the state-centric model of international relations and 
cooperation is under duress and may be continually challenged with no apparent 
detrimental side-effect from the perspective of the state itself. One could argue that the 
state of Sweden, for its part, is welcoming of this change. Other administrative changes that 
have occurred in the Ministry of Defence are not simply a reflection on that Ministry but on 
the bureaucratic structure and decision-making mechanisms of the Swedish government as 
a whole. One of such obvious ones is the greater coordination of affairs between the 
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the extent that there seems to be 
an overlap. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the office of the Prime Minister represents Sweden at 
the EU. This office also governs the permanent representation in Brussels and is the largest 
ministerial administration in Sweden, signifying the importance of foreign policy decision-
making to the state. An event that crystallises evolution in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
was Sweden's EU Presidency in the first half of 2001. For six months at a time, each 
member state has the honour of leading the European Union regardless of population size. 




This was Sweden's moment to shine and influence as many policies as possible. 144 During 
this period, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs expanded in number as it employed new 
delegates to represent Sweden unofficially, while representing the EU officially in various 
regions of the world. Membership in the European Union has forced Sweden to improve 
coordination within the state between different ministerial portfolios. Each of the ministerial 
positions tended to focus strictly on their own sectors, and only ventured out during rear 
occasions. Given the nature of the Council of Ministers however, which expected that states 
must hold a common position across many policy areas, the Prime Minister's office and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affa irs have had to make a concerted effort in terms of cooperation. 145 
Political scientists and other foreign policy scholars make the constant effort to understand 
how those ministries, concerned with foreign policy decision-making, formulate such policies 
in light of the EU. During the course of this research, one observation drawn from a similar 
attempt is that it is virtually impossible to delineate exactly how negotiations and 
compromises take place, given the informal nature of coordination. In coordinating Swedish 
EU business, civil servants and other bureaucrats often rely on these contacts - not "formal 
meetings, memos or agendas." 146 
In light of these facts, we see that membership in the EU is an integral part in the daily 
function of the Swedish state . 
The Evolution of a Small State in the EU 
Sweden was critical to this study, in that it is a small state and in so being, several 
assumptions about its role in the international system and as a member of an organisation 
of states are assumed. In general, small states do not play a large role as security actor, 
however, membership in the European Union has afforded for change in the status-quo, 
forcing a state like Sweden to devote more resources and capacity to shaping its foreign 
and security policy. 
The change in strategy of the Ministry of Defence in Sweden is indicative of the institutional 
changes caused by EU membership. Not everyone finds change favourable, arguing that 
144 Activities of the Swedish EU presidency are concisely documented in Magnus Ekengren. (2004). " National 
Foreign Policy Co-ordination: The Swedish EU Presidency"" in Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Walter 
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membership has and will continue to erode the identity of military non-alignment, for 
instance. In this instance, one challenge to sovereignty concerning institutional change is 
apparent. As I stated earlier, the formation of a NBG commits the Swedish military to an 
alliance at the very least. As a whole, the Swedish state has changed since accession. These 
changes have occurred in various areas and have included a constitutional amendment, 
transferring certain decision-making powers to the European Union's first pillar. 147 
With the Prime Minister's office taking primary responsibility for EU and foreign policy 
coordination (aided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden is able to assert her 
preferences within the complexities of the European Union. As one author notes, Swedish 
membership in the EU has shifted the state from a majoritarian democracy to one in which 
there is a vertical sepa ration of powers. 148 Overall, policy change is reflected more in the 
area of foreign affairs than institutional change. Except for the growth in the concerned 
department and the Swedish permanent representation, the NBG as a policy itself is most 
indicative of change. Sweden's change in policy is what reflects institutional change, where 
the Ministry of Defence has been overhauled to accommodate this commitment. 
Conclusions 
Change has occurred in those state structures that specifically governed foreign policy, in 
considering membership in the European Union. Change has taken place in other policy 
areas, as various government departments must attempt to coordinate European policy with 
the foreign office since European for better or worse are still considered a part of foreign 
affairs. The very nature of these bureaucratic changes in member states further reflects the 
hybrid nature of the Union as it tethers continuously on the edge of supranationalism and 
yet retains intergovernmental characteristics as coordination between the different areas of 
government continue to occur to ensure a coherent and united political stance. 
Concerning foreign policy, there are obvious differences between the British and Swedish 
outlook as the latter has sought to adapt to its idea of what European foreign policy should 
look like while the former prefers to maintain the intergovernmental nature of decision-
making. In addition, wh ile both countries have created new mechanisms and re-tailored old 
ones to account for their membership, Sweden's policies reflect the European Union better 
147 "Sweden in the EU" (2005) , Fact Sheet no. 4 http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/upload/Dokument/Trycksaker-
pdf/euu_faktablad_ 4_eng.pdf 
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than Britain does; i.e . national policies in Britain have only changed moderately in 
comparison to Sweden's for instance. 149 The reason for this may be attributed to the sizes in 
both states. This is not specifically in the area of foreign policy alone, but it certainly reflects 
the institutional attitudes of both states. 
Britain does have the advantage of being a large state that wields considerable power in the 
international system, t hrough membership in NATO and the Security Council, as well as its 
seemingly unwavering alliance with the United States. Given this, policy in Britain has not 
seen considerable cha nge, as she is able to exert influence within and without the EU. 
Institutionally however, within the departments of the British state as well as in her 
devolved administration, change, through the establishment of new offices and coordination 
mechanisms, have occu rred to meet the demands of membership in the European Union. 
A similar point in both of these cases is the extent to which the trade section of foreign 
policy has adapted to t he EU mode of operation, while security and defence lag behind 
despite the changes that have been observed. As the next section should show, there are 
advantages and disadvantages to membership from a foreign security policy perspective, 
and how each state is affected will differ. In any case, this will inform the future strength of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as an institutional mechanism, and the European 
Union as a viable securi t y actor. 150 
149 Schmidt, Viv ien A. (2006). "Adapting to Europe: Is it Harder for Britain?" The British Journal of Politics and 
I nternational Relations Vol. 8 pplS-33 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Change, Foreign Policy and the State in the European Union 
The two case studies of membership in the EU, that of Britain, a large state; and Sweden, a 
small one with a persistent military non-alignment policy, indicate some of the changes that 
have taken place in the state through the employment of adjusted bureaucratic structures 
to address trade, diplomatic, security and defence policies. 
Through the manner in which Britain functions via Whitehall, there is a reluctance to change 
and indeed, an adaptation of Europe to Britain seems a better preference as evidence shows 
through Britain's informal negotiations on the eve of the second Gulf War. The decision-
makers are aware that the EU cannot be moulded to Britain and so, they try as much as 
they can to work for Britain within Europe. In Sweden's case, institutional changes are 
embraced for the most part. These changes give a small state greater space to assert more 
prominence in high po litics, both in regional and international security issues. Through 
careful coordination, and sometimes a complete institutional shift is the case with the 
Ministry of Defence, Sweden has the potential to now effect change in determining the 
future of the CFSP. Sweden's military non-alignment policy cannot stand in practice given 
the NBG; the Swedes protect their interests during the IGCs and through the informal 
network of alliances formed by those members of the Swedish government seconded to the 
office of the Permanent Representative in Brussels, and those within the EU's supranational 
structures. 
Foreign policy making mechanisms, however, do not necessarily sit in isolation, of other 
policy mechanisms such as social policy, especially in regards to how decision making 
changes the state in general; they both call for greater coordination and that is the nature 
of membership in a new sort of institution like the European Union. The relevance or the 
uniqueness of new structures in terms of change is attached to the fact that in the area of 
foreign policy both international relations theory and practice barely provide for change. 
In the case of Europe, t he concept of Europeanisation has been used to describe any change 
that occurs within the Union. I have argued that Europeanisation is not able to explain the 
employment of new foreign policy mechanisms however, as it does not give adequate 
concern to the influence of state structure in moulding what becomes EU policy. 151 The 
complexities of foreign policy studies, within the specific context of a hybrid institution such 
151 Blair a, op. cit. p585 
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as the European Union, therefore cannot fit within an already designated rubric, such as 
Europeanisation. 
As was initially asserted, foreign policy is an area where states are unwilling to· compromise 
on, despite the inevitability that the EU seems to present, for one crucial reason: 
sovereignty. While this study has adapted a specific meaning to sovereignty, it is still 
important to elucidate a cursory understanding of the legal or philosophical notion of 
sovereignty, because this understanding dictates the actions of most state actors. Finally, 
the examination of sovereignty, as it pertains to the state's foreign relations, warrants a 
redefinition or at least a re-examination in light of the EU. In understanding sovereignty, 
one might gauge the implications for the success of the CFSP through the possibility of 
further evolution of current emergent foreign policy mechanisms. 
What is Sovereignty? 
Given the manner in which sovereignty was redefined for this study, one might assume that 
its definition is malleable and cannot be taken for granted. If this is the case, the answer to 
the question "what is sovereignty?" is either rhetorical or needs further examination. Many 
assumed the opposite of the concept i.e. sovereignty was deemed as unchanging with a 
specific definition. In recent years, several political scientists have published a spate of 
literature addressing t he question of the nature of sovereignty, especially in Europe. 152 
Georg S0rensen links t his newfound interest in sovereignty to change as scholars try to 
decide if the concept of sovereignty is static or changing within the international system. 153 
The initial concept of sovereignty was that, the authority governing each state was the one 
and final one. There was no higher power to report to, and every other state was obliged to 
respect this arrangement, otherwise commence a war. 154 This understanding of sovereignty, 
' unitary' or indivisible sovereignty, was established in European political discourse through 
the work of Jean Bodin in 1577. 155 This conception of sovereignty informed Thomas Hobbes' 
creation of the sovereign in Leviathan, one of the primary antecedents to Morgenthau's 
Politics among Nations . This classic understanding of sovereignty proposes that it is 
152 Mlberts, Tanja E. (2004). "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe- A Constructivist 
Reading, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 42, No. 1 pp23-46; Wallace, William. (1999) . "The Sharing of 
Sovereignty: the European Paradox" Political Studies XLVII, pp503- 521 
153 S0rensen, Georg. (1999). "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution" Political Studies, 
XLVII, pp590-604; Keohane, Robert 0. (2002). "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United 
States" Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 pp743-765, p743 
154 Bull, Hedley cited in Keohane, op. cit p746 
ISS Ibid. 
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indivisible and therefore unchanging. 156 In this way, our understanding of states and their 
roles and limitations was informed in the field of International Relations. 
The constructivists who say sovereignty is "a socially constructed trait" elucidate the 
problem with this explanation of sovereignty. 157 The state's authority has never stood alone 
without some sort of interdependence, whether it was through trade, alliances or treaties 
that create obligations. This does not imply that states or their leaders did not act as they 
wished, but it was only to an extent. 158 So, despite the problem posed by the traditional 
understanding of the concept, the state had a measure of 'sovereignty' in that the 
government of a particular state was the last authority on any decision. This is the intrinsic 
nature of the state system. 
From the perspective of this thesis, which sees institutional change within the state as a 
consequence of the European Union, sovereignty tends to be problematic. First, the 
indivisible nature of sovereignty is called to question. State structures must adapt precisely 
because authority cent res are shifting or have the potential to shift. If the cohesive 
authority of one entity (the state) determines sovereignty, one can argue that the 
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty is insufficient and indeed affected by the change 
processes. 
Sovereignty itself, as an institution of the state, is undergoing major changes as authority is 
being delegated to the EU. The delegation of authority between member states and the EU 
entity has been termed multi-level governance, as the Frontier becomes more evident in the 
relations that now define European states. 
Sovereignty in Multi-Level Governance 
Resurgence in the study of sovereignty is occurring because of change, which is crystallised 
by the advent of multi-level governance. Examining sovereignty in terms of multi-level 
governance is a consequence of the European Union, in two critical ways: on a general 
level, states have even less control over every aspect of their domestic policy following 
membership in the Union. On a more particular level, the area of external policy where 
156 Lake, David A. (2003) "The New Sovereignty in International Relations" International Studies Review Vol. 5 pp 
303-323, p305 
157 Ibid., p308 
158 In " Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A Further Look" (1967) Ali Mazrui noted that the sovereign in whom 
sovereignty is constituted is limited by the basic fact that he is human and therefore his exercise of sovereignty is 
limited. p107-108 
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states are assumed to retain sovereignty is changing. Just as foreign policy state structures 
have changed, those changes are now informing the future of the CFSP. At its current 
strength and with further changes within the state, the CFSP has the potential to supersede 
any individual state's policy preferences~ 159 
Sovereignty in the European Union, as either an intergovernmental organisation or a 
supranational institution, is unique; in this sense, many scholars have termed sovereignty in 
the function of the EU as "pooled."160 Stanley Hoffmann argues that, although this seems to 
be a deviation from the traditional sovereignty, pooled sovereignty does not take power 
away from the state, but strengthens state power, while allowing the state to adjust to the 
international system. As explained, sovereignty is not lost but "redistributed,"161 an exercise 
that cannot be conceived given the original definition of sovereignty. This sort of 
sovereignty is also known as cooperative sovereignty. 162 Our current understanding of 
foreign policy as a funct ion of the European Union proves this point, somewhat, as power to 
make external trade policy is delegated to the Union while states still decide on their own 
security and defence. Hoffmann's argument heavily rests on the belief that the EU is more 
or less an intergovernmental institution not a supranational one. 163 Although the CFSP 
functions for the most part at an intergovernmental level, one must be careful not to 
attribute this to the entire institution; the EU is a hybrid. 
"Multi-level governance presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as 
consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies. "164 The EU, in essence, 
challenges one of the basic tenets of the international system. If one considers sovereignty 
as a set of institutiona l attributes however, not in a theoretical or philosophical sense, its 
engagement in the EU may be better understood. 
While this paper does not dedicate complete attention to the notion of sovereignty, 
attempting to understand the concept in the context of multi-level governance helps to 
understand the institution that is the Union. It also helps to understand why or how the 
CFSP and the CESDP remain largely an intergovernmental effort. As alluded to much earlier 
159 On Iraq, the CFSP seemed to fail dismally; currently however, there seems to be consensus on how Iran's quest 
for nuclear power should be handled, giving hope to the revival of the CFSP. 
160Supra note 131; 
161 Ibid. 
162 Besson, Samantha. "Sovereignty in Conflict" European Integration Online Papers Vol. 8, No . 15 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm pp1-50, p13 accessed 23 Mar 2006 
163 Stanley Hoffmann cited in Bulmer, Simon and Lequesne, Christian. (2002). "New Perspectives on EU-Member 
State Relationships" Centre d 'etudes et de Recherches Internationale, Questions de Recherche, No. 4 
164 AAiberts, op.cit. p23 
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in this paper, the second pillar of Maastricht established the CFSP to help member states 
coordinate foreign policies. The construct of the pillar is quite ambiguous as it currently 
stands, if one considers like many integrationists that the CFSP should be the official foreign 
policy mechanism of all member states. Certainly, states would still state their preferences, 
but not one state should be able to act alone. For now, states technically have control of 
their foreign policy but coordinate in certain areas, as evidenced by the office of the High 
Representative and the newly employed institutional mechanisms. Given that our current 
understanding of the different foreign policy mechanisms of Britain and Sweden tell us there 
has been some change, we now turn to how that change can be used in practice through 
the CFSP. 
The next section examines the effect the state's institutional changes made on the 
formation of a common foreign policy in the EU. It will look at the current structures 
assessing their current strength, their potential and the advantages and disadvantages that 
may come with that potential. It will look to the future of the foreign policy making within 
the European Union. It views the implications, as the traditional understanding of 
sovereignty seems to lose its last hold on the state-centric system. 
From CFSP to CESDP - Europe as an independent security policy actor? 
Although the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union are now 
considered quite progressive, it was initially weak in the Maastricht treaty. The CFSP was 
nominally effective especially in regards to development policy and it created the basis for a 
security policy. For one, the EU became much more recognised worldwide as one political 
entity with just as much presence as the United States or some of its larger member states, 
headed by Javier Solana. However, within the EU itself, the intent of how the CFSP should 
function was better that its actual function and so, in 1999, the Union took more steps 
towards a future many integrationists believe is possible for the European Union. 
At the end of 1999, t he "institutional structures for the CESDP" were established. The 
CESDP stands for the Common European Security and Defence Policy, which replaced the 
European Security and Defence Policy .165 It is not clear if the CESDP is a separate foreign 
policy area from the CFSP or a sector within it; in any case, the CESDP further 
institutionalised the European Union's high politics, and in so doing the Political and Security 
165 ESRC One Europe or Several? Programme. (2001). "The Common European and Security Defence Policy, " 
Briefing Note 1/01 
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Committee (PSC) was established in the Treaty of Nice. 166 Although the mechanisms of the 
CESDP present, in theory, a stronger and united European capability, the actual strength of 
the CESDP as a supra-national security entity is tarnished because of its relationship to 
NATO. In short, the CESDP seems more like a tactical unit to support NATO where the North 
Atlantic alliance, particularly the United States is unwilling to be involved as was the case 
during the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia. This may be interpreted to mean that 
CESDP is operational only when the Americans are disinterested in a particular issue, and 
this is the position of the British involvement in the CESDP. . 
This is reflected in the fact that primary role of European Defence is still reliant on NATO, 
not the CESDP. Indeed, given the youth of this European endeavour at security, perhaps it 
is wiser that NATO does retain the primary role, but for the CESDP to attain any significance 
worthy of its name, its relationship with NATO will need redefinition. There is the fear that a 
strong European defence force would undermine NATO, although to what detriment that 
would be, is not clearly articulated. Since NATO was created as a response to the threat of 
communism and strong USSR, the non-existence of these two threats should mean a 
restructuring of NATO at the very least. At present, the activities of the CESDP are 
restricted to interventions in those cases where the Americans are reluctant to get involved, 
i.e. ESDP forces are more likely to be found in Africa than NATO's. 
Thus, on the one hand a major obstacle to the progression of a European common foreign 
policy is the reluctance of the states themselves, and on the other is the existence of NATO, 
to which Britain especially is reluctant to forsake. From the foregoing, we note that although 
institutions are changing, actual policies are much slower to change. In addition, 
sovereignty is not declined, although a change in our understanding of the concept is 
necessitated by EU developments. 
The consequence of these obstacles is that the CESDP is stalled. In principle, many of the 
EU nations have agreed to contributing the manpower to rotational battle groups that can 
deploy within 60 days to anywhere in the world where they are needed. There is a problem 
however with fulfilling that agreement as evidenced by the current debate to deploy EU 
troops to the Congo. Because the CFSP is not binding as the first pillar or parts of the third, 
t here is no compulsion on the part of Germany, for instance, to deploy troops to the Congo 
166 Ibid. 
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even when the United Nations have asked the European Union for help. 167 Most problematic 
is the inability of member states to decide on who should lead the project. 168 There is very 
little political will to cede decision-making concerning foreign policy to the Union. Even 
within the two countries that constitute the focus of this paper, the CESDP should rather 
remain an intergovernmental effort. This would be in order for Sweden to maintain its 
sovereignty and therefore neutrality, while allowing Britain the freedom to maintain her 
Atlantic alliance. There are benefits of CESDP in terms of further integration as well as the 
image of the EU projected outside of Europe, but the issue of sovereignty is hindering so 
where do we go from here? 
Certainly, there are disadvantages to strengthening the second pillar above the 
intergovernmental level as this paper has explored; it explains why the common policy 
mechanism seems to have come to a standstill. Nevertheless, the policy analysts especially, 
are not broaching the positive where they should be. Using Helen Sjursen's paper as a 
starting point, the CFSP could be strengthened through an institutional arrangement that 
would be binding on all members of the Union using a rights-based foreign policy 
approach. 169 Effectively, a rights-based foreign policy would stem from the need that the 
members signing on have the same concerns, want to solve the same problems and are 
adherent to the rule of law. It is not incomprehensible to suppose that the EU's CFSP is 
capable of this, since certain common interests breed intergovernmental organisations 
initially. The one advantage of this approach is that it would reinforce legitimacy of the 
Union and its members' action in the international system. Its inability to act for lack of 
consensus will inevitably tarnish the legitimacy of the EU as an institution - and perhaps 
that of member states who have built their reputation on membership - in the international 
community. 
The future of the CFSP will depend on how the fear of losing sovereignty, and the 
responsibility to help s ape the international system measure against each other in the 
opinion of member states. 
167 CNN World. (7/3/2006) "EU Can 't Agree on Congo Force: Germany France Pressured to Take Lead" 
http :/ / www.cnn .com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/07/eu .congo.ap/index. html accessed on 9 Mar. 2006 ; subsequently 
t o the initial report, Germany has agreed in principle to lead on certain condit ions. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Sjursen, Helen. "Towards a Post-national Foreign and Security Policy" Arena Working Papers 04/12 
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Conclusion: Is the state diminishing as an agent of international relations? 
Although foreign policy bureaucratic mechanisms have changed in at least two states owing 
to membership in the European Union, states continue to be the driving force behind foreign 
policy agenda on the continent for the present. They are still protective of their national 
security identity and are intent on retaining sovereignty. The changes, however, suggest 
that we pay attention to what the future might hold for both the state and the European 
Union as institutions in the international system, especially as states themselves, have the 
most important role to play in this process from the perspective of the CFSP. 
The international state system is beset by challenges to its state-centric mentality, one of 
which is the European Union. States in Europe, particularly member states of the Union as 
illustrated by Britain and Sweden, have had to re-orient many aspects of their policies, but 
more importantly, they have had to change the ways in which they arrive at policy since 
j oining the EU. This has been done through the establishment of new offices, representation 
in Brussels and the employment of new strategies. There is greater coordination between 
national government departments and ministries who, through negotiations and bargaining 
states, are able to convey their preferences within the institution of the EU. Indeed, some 
have better luck at getting their preferences through, but in the final analysis, when 
compromise has been reached in the Council of Ministers; the decision is binding and carried 
out by the Commission, unless it concerns foreign policy. 
Within states, foreign- policy mechanisms have also had to be re-oriented. Change in this 
area of policy however had the most impact on the state because it touches on the core 
definition of a state in t he international system - sovereignty. To this, the change in foreign 
policy mechanisms, where Britain and Sweden must account for membership in the Union, 
has resulted in a change for the state from an international relations perspective. 
Admittedly, the change is ongoing and to some extent, reluctant. Nonetheless, it is 
happening. 
There is potential for fu rther change, which is contingent on the further evolution of foreign 
policy mechanisms. The future of the state and the EU will depend on these mechanisms as 
a permanent decision is reached about a common foreign and security policy. Sovereignty 
may be dear to states but so is legitimacy, which makes having a CFSP and the CEDSP 
critical to the future of t he European Union as a security policy actor. In principle the CFSP 
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has been strengthened since the Maastricht treaty, but repeatedly, when coherence and 
effectiveness are put to the test, the CFSP's attempt at one voice for Europe tends to fail. 
As noted above, there are advantages and disadvantages to the evolution of foreign policy 
mechanisms that would encourage a stronger supranational European security and defence 
policy. Yet, is the EU willing to risk all the benefits of integration if it does not consider other 
alternatives to strict intergovernmentalism at this level? 
Sjursen notes that although supranationality might be a huge leap, there are changes 
reflected in the mechanisms employed now to suggest a move beyond intergovernmental 
arrangements. 170 Perhaps then, even a changed CFSP cannot fit within the rubrics of defined 
international relations' terms. At present, it is sufficient to note that foreign policy 
institutions within states have changed and continue to change as a result of the EU. Th is, 
in turn, informs the CFSP. Only time will tell whether the CFSP, and therefore the CESDP, 
will emerge as a viable policy mechanism in the European Union as well as in the 
international system . 
170 Sjursen, supra note 162 
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